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INTRODUCTION
In a seminal article published in The Yale Law Journal during the
late 1970s, Professor Derrick Bell offered a stinging critique of the
country's premier public interest law firm.' Bell critiqued conflicts
that developed between attorneys for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
23(LDF) and clients whom they represented in the Detroit,' Atlanta,
and Boston 4 school desegregation class actions. He concluded that in
all three cases the lawyer-client conflict stemmed from a common
source: LDF's failure to reconsider its policy of pursuing racial-
balance orders as the sole remedy for de jure segregation of public
schools after it became apparent that such orders no longer were po-
litically or legally viable. LDF attorneys were remiss, Bell claimed, in
rigidly adhering to the notion that Brown v. Board of Education5 re-
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Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
2 See Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 242-45 (6th Cir. 1973) (ordering a multidis-
trict remedy for segregation in city schools), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (finding
the multidistrict remedy improper absent findings that suburban districts intentionally
had committed acts to cause segregation in city schools).
See Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804, 808-10 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (per curiam)
(approving a city-only desegregation plan that minimized pupil integration), affd, 522
F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975).
4 See Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974) (upholding a deseg-
regation plan that failed to consider the issue of "white flight" and included a substan-
tial amount of busing to achieve integrated schools), afJd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan,
530 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1976).
5 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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quired racially balanced schools even after it had become clear that
not only recalcitrant whites but also sympathetic federal judges and-
most importantly--their own clients rejected desegregation as the sole
remedy for educational inequality. Bell viewed this rigidity as a func-
tion of an ethical tension inherent in LDF's attempts to serve two
groups whose interests and objectives diverged: on the one hand were
LDF's clients-who suffered the quotidian disadvantages of desegre-
gation, including busing across long distances to schools whose educa-
tional merit was often questionable; on the other were LDF's constitu-
ents-financial contributors who unfailingly supported the goal of
achieving an integrated society.7
Though it is a point elided by commentators who emphasize his
racial polemics, Bell did not view the "two masters" his article identi-
fied solely in terms of race. Serving Two Masters was premised on a war
between classes-the rich versus the poor-as well as on the paradig-
matic battle of black versus white. More specifically, Bell's article
counterposed poor (black) clients against wealthy (mostly white) con-
stituents. In his view, wealthy whites (and a few middle-class black
leaders who followed white contributors' lead) were overly influential
in LDF's decision making about appropriate remedies in the school
desegregation cases.' To resolve this dilemma, Bell suggested that
public interest lawyers who represented plaintiffs in school desegrega-
tion cases should exercise a great deal of deference to their clients'
remedial preferences. In particular, he argued that clients, rather
than outsider constituencies, should determine whether integration
was an appropriate remedy for educational discrimination. 9
This Article challenges Bell's conclusions in important ways while
taking seriously, as an analytical matter, the questions of whether and
how class conflict affects litigation in race discrimination cases. Most
legal commentators who have discussed the constitutional issues pre-
6 Bell, suffra note 1, at 471-72; see also id. at 482-93 (considering these issues in the
context of the individual cases).
7 See id. at 490-91 (defining "clients" as "those on whose behalf" the civil rights at-
torney brings suit and "constituents" as "those to whom the attorney must answer for
his actions" (citing Ronald R. Edmonds, Advocating Inequity: A Critique of the Civil Rights
Attorney in Class Action Desegregation Suits, 3 BLACK L.J. 176, 178-79 (1974))).
8 See id. at 490 ("The lawyers' freedom to pursue their own ideas of right may pose
no problems as long as both clients and contributors share a common social outlook.
But when the views of some or all of the clients change, a delayed recognition and re-
sponse by the lawyers is predictable.").
See id. at 489-93 (arguing that the fee-paying minority in a class action should not
control the direction of the suit for all the plaintiffs).
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sented by America's continuing dilemma of race have either over-
looked class as an analytical factor or invoked its salience while failing
to demonstrate empirically its relevance. Yet the question of how
economic disadvantage affects, indeed orders, social relations is an is-
sue that for years has animated scholars in disciplines outside of the
law. 
0
In addressing this question here, I use a particular kind of legal
history-locally based "sociolegal" history. This approach to legal his-
tory combines an analysis of developments in litigation with a detailed
discussion of the social dynamics in a single locality in order to high-
light nuances overlooked in nationally oriented, case-law-driven legal
history. In particular, this methodology uncovers the effect of intrara-
cial, class-based conflict on two fascinating, yet unheralded, civil rights
class actions involving the desegregation of Atlanta schools: Calhoun
v. Cook and Armour v. Nix." In analyzing the social, political, and eco-
nomic circumstances surrounding the Atlanta desegregation cases, I
seek to demonstrate how locally based sociolegal history can help us
more fully understand the human and structural factors that animate
the success or failure of legal campaigns against inequality. Specifi-
cally, I show that Brown's meaning and practical impact in local juris-
dictions did not result only from the actions and opinions of heroic
civil rights lawyers and whites-whetherjudges, lawyers, politicians, or
violent resisters to equality-as much legal commentary has implied.
Integrating the social history of client-communities into the legal his-
tory of the Atlanta school desegregation cases demonstrates that the
ideological perspectives and social circumstances of local African
10 See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 19-23,
134-43 (2d ed. 1980) (arguing that diminished life chances of blacks correlate more
highly with economic class position than racism and that the civil rights agenda of the
NAACP reflected the values and needs of the black middle class); WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 140-64 (1987) (advocating movement beyond race-specific policies that benefit
middle-class blacks to initiatives that address the ills of socially, economically, and geo-
graphically isolated blacks living in cities); see also ROBIN D.G. KELLEY, HAMMER AND
HOE: ALABAMA COMMUNISTS DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1990) [hereinafter
KELLEY, HAMMER AND HOE] (uncovering a history of black workers who identified
themselves as oppressed on the basis of class and allied themselves with the Alabama
Communist Party rather than civil rights groups such as the NAACP); ROBIN D.G.
KELLEY, RACE REBELS: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND THE BLACK WORKING CLASS (1994)
[hereinafter KELLEY, RACE REBELS] (discussing noninstitutionalized forms of resis-
tance to authority and hegemonic norms among working-class minorities).
Armour v. Nix, Civ. No. 16708, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9609 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 24,
1979).
2003] 1915
1916 (NIVERSITY OFPEINNSYLVANIAIAWIEVIJIW [Vol. 151:1913
Americans"2 influenced the path that Brown took in various communi-
ties as well. Brown's putative beneficiaries were not, then, passive re-
cipients of legal strategy and courtjudgments.
The Atlanta narrative demonstrates, in particular, the social
agency of black middle-class decision makers who rejected the integra-
tion-oriented remedy favored by LDF over the objections of a group of
working-class and poor plaintiff class members. The Calhoun and Ar-
mour plaintiff classes were split into multiple opposing camps based on
their divergent remedial preferences. Some, including a contingent
of working-class and poor plaintiffs, favored using busing as a tool for
achieving meaningful pupil integration. Others favored improved
schools but did not express a strong or informed opinion about what
kind of court order would achieve this goal. Still others, a small group
of middle-class black leaders who were supported by local white elites,
demanded black administrative control of the school system and a
remedy that minimized pupil integration. I argue here that the per-
spective of this last group, the biracial elite, prevailed in the courts
largely because presiding judges did not meaningfully address the re-
ality that poor blacks had interests distinguishable from those of the
middle-class blacks who were the self-proclaimed leaders of the entire
African American community. The Atlanta narrative thus reveals the
relevance of intraracial social dynamics, particularly class dynamics, to
effective public interest lawyering and to effective remedies for consti-
tutional violations.
The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. Part I ex-
plores how and why the legal literature that considers the issue of
school desegregation generally omits discussions of intraracial, class-
based conflict. I demonstrate that by privileging white resistance and
doctrinal concepts, legal scholars have offered an incomplete analysis
of the factors that undermined civil rights lawyers' efforts to imple-
ment Brown and, by analogy, the problems that beset other efforts to
reform society through law.
In Part II, I offer empirical support for the claim that scholarship
on Brown's implementation is incomplete because it fails to consider
intraracial dynamics. I analyze the legal and political maneuvering
that led to the settlement of the Atlanta school desegregation cases in
a manner that a vocal contingent of working-class and poor plaintiffs
found inadequate. I draw upon transcript testimony of hearings held
12 1 use the terms "black" and "African American" interchangeably throughout this
Article.
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by the federal district court to entertain objections to the settlement
as well as other evidence to demonstrate that socioeconomic class was
a factor salient in lawyers', politicos', and nonlawyers' deliberations
about the settlement. Class consciousness and class interests influ-
enced the substantive provisions of the settlement, the extent to which
and manner in which the proposed settlement was discussed by law-
yers and clients, and clients' perceptions of the settlement's efficacy.
A further point here is that the law-its norms, rules, and proce-
dures-was constitutive in decision makers' ability to attain a remedy
that favored the preferences of the black middle-class leadership and
delegitimized the concerns of the black working poor.
In Part III, I discuss the normative implications of the historical
analysis offered in the previous sections of the Article. These implica-
tions relate to scholarly assessments of the significance of Brown v.
Board of Education and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion,13 the utility of the sameness norm relied on to settle disputes in
equal protection jurisprudence, and the power of empirically based
social history to inform the continuing debate about whether signifi-
cant social reform can be achieved through law. I conclude by chal-
lenging scholars, public interest lawyers, and courts to account for the
multidimensionality of plaintiffs in civil rights actions when consider-
ing, litigating, and adjudicating their constitutional claims.
I. AGAINST EXCEPTIONALISM IN LEGAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF RACE
One of the most provocative concepts in labor history is "Ameri-
can exceptionalism," the notion that class consciousness was relatively
undeveloped among the working classes in the United States when
compared to the working classes of Europe.14 American labor histori-
ans have worked assiduously over the years to correct the exceptional-
ism misconception. Through research projects focused both on ac-
tivities within trade unions and without, these historians have
uncovered a history of working-class culture and consciousness among
Americans, including vibrant stories of workers organizing collectively
to demand safer workplaces, more competitive wages, and union rep-
13 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
14 For a discussion of American exceptionalism, see LEON FINK, Looking Backward:
Reflections on Workers' Culture and Certain Conceptual Dilemmas Within Labor History, in IN
SEARCH OF THE WORKING CLASS 175 (1994).
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resentation." Much of this scholarship explores the class conscious-
ness of African American workers, women, and others not tradition-
ally perceived as legitimate wage earners. 16 The persuasive power of
these works lies in their painstakingly detailed descriptions of associa-
tions, habits, behaviors, and acts of protest that elucidate the experi-
ences of the working classes-their cultures, communities, beliefs, and
organizations.
I propose that a variant of the "exceptionalism" idea functions
within the legal literature addressing race-related equal protection ju-
risprudence, and that this idea needs to be corrected by similarly de-
tailed historical analysis. This "exceptionalism" functions to disregard
the existence of class (and other) differences among African Ameri-
cans, to obscure significant differences in African Americans' lived
experiences that are related to these class differences, and to neglect
the possibility that such class (and other) differences might lead to
distinct, perhaps even competing, perspectives on public policies and
15 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 3-36 (1991) (outlining the American labor movement in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, and analyzing the law's considerable influence on
labor conflicts during that period); HERBERT G. GUTMAN, WORK, CULTURE, AND
SOCIETY IN INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA (Vintage Books 1977) (1966) (exploring the be-
liefs and behavior of working-class Americans during the nineteenth century); DAVID
MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA (1979) (contemplating the control
position of the American worker against the backdrop of increasing demands for rising
productivity); LEON FINK, The New Labor History and the Powers of Historical Pessimism:
Consensus, Hegemony, and the Case of the Knights of Labor, in IN SEARCH OF THE WORKING
CLASS, supra note 14, at 89, 90-91 (arguing that "the history of the Knights of Labor
["the largest and most representative labor body until its time"] demonstrates the exis-
tence of a viable labor culture").
16 For examples of literature that subverts the exceptionalism myth, see HERBERT
HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1985); DOLORES E. JANIEWSKI,
SISTERHOOD DENIED: RACE, GENDER, AND CLASS IN A NEW SOUTH COMMUNITY (1985);
DAVID M. KATZMAN, SEVEN DAYS A WEEK: WOMEN AND DOMESTIC SERVICE IN
INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA (1978); NELL IRVIN PAINTER, THE NARRATIVE OF HOSEA
HUDSON: HIS LIFE AS A NEGRO COMMUNIST IN THE SOUTH (1979); PETERJ. RACHLEFF,
BLACK LABOR IN RICHMOND, 1865-1890 (Illini Books 1989) (1984); JOE WILLIAM
TROTTER, JR., BLACK MILWAUKEE: THE MAKING OF AN INDUSTRIAL PROLETARIAT, 1915-
45 (1985). For a study of the indispensable contribution enslaved people made to "the
development of black culture and black national consciousness as well as to American
nationality as a whole," see EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD
THE SLAVES MADE, at xvi (1974). More recent works relevant to the myth of excep-
tionalism include TERA W. HUNTER, TO 'JoY MY FREEDOM: SOUTHERN BLACK
WOMEN'S LIVES AND LABORS AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (1997); KELLEY, HAMMER AND HOE,
supra note 10; KELLEY, RACE REBELS, supra note 10.
RACE AS IDENTITY CARICATURE
laws that impact African Americans based on their racial categoriza-
tion."
The scholarly literature on the implementation of Brown is espe-
cially revelatory of this phenomenon. A narrow, racial understanding
of African American plaintiffs' interests was to be expected in the ear-
lier years of commentary about the case, given that the right at issue
was the dismantling of de jure racial segregation in schools. Legal
commentators' failure to consider the remedial consequences of in-
traracial conflict later on-after the problems attendant to imple-
menting the decree became clear-is less understandable and less jus-
tifiable.
Scholars' failure to take up Bell's challenge in Serving Two Masters
to consider the relevance of class to LDF's decision making in school
desegregation suits is indicative of their failure to confront the ques-
tion of how social dynamics within African American communities af-
fect social policy and legal strategy. This is not to say that Bell's article
was completely ignored. Quite the contrary is true. Following its pub-
lication, a generation of scholars discussed and debated many of the
themes that Bell discussed in Serving Two Masters, but they did so
chiefly in terms of constitutional law and theory-hence, abstractly
rather than empirically. Both conservative commentators"' and leftist
critical theorists' questioned the efficacy of litigation as a tool for
17 In using the term "class," I mean not only to refer to relations between indi-
viduals of different economic levels-that is, those with lesser, versus those with
greater, wealth, skills, goods, and services-but also to membership in social status
groups. See MAX WEBER, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft [Economics and Society], in FROM MAX
WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 180, 181-82 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds.,
1948) (1921) (stating that the economic order and the social order are distinct con-
cepts, but both are related to the distribution of power within a community). Al-
though social status and privileged economic-class standing are related concepts,
wealth and status do not necessarily correlate, especially within African American
communities, where professionals (e.g., secondary school educators) not of great
wealth historically have been accorded considerable social status. See, e.g., Tomiko
Brown-Nagin, The Transformation of a Social Movement into Law? The SCLC and NAACP's
Campaigns for Civil Rights Reconsidered in Light of the Educational Activism of Septima Clark,
8 WOMEN'S HIsT. REv. 81, 115, 132 n.66, 136 n.97 (1999) (discussing the status of Afri-
can American teachers and other professionals). See generally E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER,
BLACK BOURGEOISIE 43-59 (1957) (detailing the statistical breakdown of black, middle-
class, white-collar employment and black-owned businesses).
18 See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 61-86 (1984)
(arguing that cases implementing Brown were ill-conceived and counterproductive).
19lSee, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 1-20 (1983) (suggesting that legal rea-
soning is a form of argumentation that does not address the legitimacy of social, politi-
cal, and economic outcomes that legal decisions authorize); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
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achieving large-scale social change of a countermajoritarian nature.
Legal ethicists and civil proceduralists evaluated whether the Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility and doctrine governing the law-
yer/client relationship adequately protect the interests of the many
parties who may be affected by class action litigation.20 And constitu-
tional scholars considered whether the Court's antidiscrimination
doctrine requires the full-scale restructuring of public institutions
guilty of practicing racial discrimination in the past or merely de-
mands the establishment of prophylactic rules to protect against fu-
21
ture discrimination. In focusing on these matters, this generation of
UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 15-42 (1986) (deconstructing no-
tions of objective legal analysis and arguing that legal norms preserve dominant inter-
ests); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363-94 (1984) (insisting
that rights are indeterminate and antithetical to causes that seek fundamentally to re-
structure society); see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (proposing, on the basis of empirical data, that
seminal Supreme Court decisions in areas such as civil and women's rights impeded
significant social reform rather than produced major change); cf Kimberl6 Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidis-
crimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1376-81 (1988) (arguing that antidiscrimina-
tion law relies on ambiguous norms suggesting a symbolic commitment to equality
while producing ephemeral results that neglect material disadvantage and threaten the
political consciousness of minority groups).
20 See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS ANDJUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 341-57 (1988)
(discussing the ethical problems inherent to representing divided class members in a
class action suit); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Ac-
tions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 349-67 (addressing doctrinal avenues for protecting the
interests of class members in a mass tort context); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in
Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1191-221 (1982) (postulating that full disclosure of
conflict, but not necessarily deference to plaintiffs' preferences, could enhance ade-
quacy of representation); William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate." Addressing Disputes
Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997)
(discussing ways that procedural and ethical rules could promote group decision mak-
ing to settle conflicts in class actions); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Ade-
quote Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571, 573 (1997) (arguing that "every class member
whose.., identity can be reasonably ascertained has a constitutionally protected right
to prosecute his cause of action by presenting evidence and making legal arguments
not otherwise before the court," and that allowing each class member to intervene as a
party "has the potential to significantly improve the quality of representation afforded"
to all class members).
21 This discussion first took place around the issue of school desegregation and
then moved to the issue of affirmative action for women and minorities in education
and employment. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and
the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 731-49 (1986) (comparing and contrasting
prophylactic norms with antidiscrimination rules that require dishonoring of individu-
als' preferences not to attend desegregated schools); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, in
AFTER IDENTITY 67, 76-80 (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle eds., 1995) (describing the
cultural origins of the conflict over the advisability and proper focus of affirmative ac-
tion).
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legal scholars neglected a sustained discussion of Bell's suggestion
that a relationship existed between socioeconomic status and the re-
medial outcomes preferred by LDF's clients, as opposed to those pre-
• 22
ferred by its constituents.
Furthermore, when Bell's work inspired commentary, legal schol-
ars analyzed the constitutional, procedural, ethical, and theoretical
dilemmas posed by LDF's effort to implement Brown solely in terms of
race. In doing so, these scholars made race an overdetermined cate-
gory of analysis. For example, constitutional scholars' prescriptions
for implementation of Brown focused on the appropriate doctrinal re-
21
sponses to white resistance. Implicitly or explicitly, these scholars as-
sumed the existence of a unified plaintiff class and appreciated the
conflict in school desegregation actions as between the races-the
white racists, on the one hand, and the African American victims, on
the other. More surprising is the tendency of critics of liberal legal
scholarship, whether critical theorists or critical race theorists, to give
little sustained analytical or descriptive attention to the matter of how,
specifically, legal norms and ideology legitimate the class structure
and exacerbate racial disadvantage .
22 Bell did not substantiate this claim himself, but he cited with approval social sci-
entist Ron Edmonds's proposition that LDF lawyers' efforts to serve their clients were
hamstrung by middle-class whites and blacks who refused to reexamine the organiza-
tion's policy of advocating school integration, notwithstanding the alleged costs of the
practice to its putative beneficiaries. Bell, supra note 1, at 490-91; see also supra note 7
and accompanying text (discussing the disparity between clients' and constituents'
goals).
23 See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 608-65 (1983)
(proposing judicial responses to, and compromises with, white resistance to desegre-
gated schools); James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Recon-
struction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reforn, 76 VA. L. REV.
349, 360-70 (1990) (suggesting a reorientation of political processes so that white resis-
tance to desegregation would be understood to harm public interest generally, rather
than to infringe individuals' private interests).
24 At Bell's prompting, some scholars acknowledged that some African Americans,
like many whites, opposed desegregation of the schools. These scholars failed, how-
ever, to grapple with this conflict analytically. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 23, at 594-95
(understanding differences of opinion among black plaintiffs in school desegregation
class actions as being indicative of "unavoidable remedial imperfection").
25 While critical theorists contend that legal ideology and rights consciousness le-
gitimate the social order, their focus on rhetoric has not generated a sustained analysis
of how legal norms validate specific social phenomena in which class relations are im-
plicated. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 19, at 1364, 1398-403 (arguing that law protects
the interests of the privileged, but defending his critique of rights against the "working-
class rejoinder" that some rights, such as the collective bargaining structure, are impor-
tant and effective for laborers); cf MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 1-30 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1977) (asserting that
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One reason for legal scholars' staunch allegiance to a narrow, ra-
cialist understanding of the constitutional problems associated with
the school desegregation issue is the fact that the most notorious cases
were predicated on the Deep South archetype. These cases arose in
locales where racial lines were drawn so tightly and whites were so in-
transigent to racial change that differences among African American
plaintiffs were obscured. In these places, the activities of local white
racists dominated contemporaneous accounts of developments in
school desegregation cases.
Little Rock was such a locale. The dramatic events that occurred
there-the violent resistance of whites to nine young blacks, dressed
in their Sunday best, attempting to integrate the high school, and the
subsequent arrival of National Guard troops to protect the black stu-
dents as they entered the school-served as a basis, not only in the
public imagination but also within legal academia, for theorizing
about the constitutional issues presented by the effort to implementBr 26
Brown. Similarly, the most famous incidents in the public memory of
the direct action phase of the Civil Rights Movement-Bull Connor's
changes in common law rules advanced the interests of powerful elites, but focusing
on trends in doctrine rather than on the social history of non-elites whose interests
were not advanced by changes in the law). On the critical theorists' failure to discuss
issues of race to the extent favored by critical race scholars, see Crenshaw, supra note
19, at 1356-66. See alsoJos6 A. Bracamonte, Foreword to Symposium, Minority Critiques of
the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 298 (1987) (stating
that the critical legal studies movement has "failed to comprehend, assess, and respond
to the reality of minorities in this country").
Some critical race theorists mention class as a salient factor in critiquing antidis-
crimination discourse, but they do not make class a central factor in their analyses. See,
e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACIsM
3-12 (1992) (noting the income gap between whites and blacks, but citing inadequate
legal redress of white racism as the cause of continued subordination of African
Americans); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991) (acknowledging
that class shapes the experiences of women of color, but focusing only on the gender
and racial dimensions of their experiences); Crenshaw, supra note 19, at 1378-79 (rec-
ognizing that the elimination of state-enforced discrimination affected blacks differ-
ently depending on their "material disadvantage"); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of 'Our
Constitution Is Color-Blind,"44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 36-52 (1991) (arguing that constitu-
tional discourse on race fosters white domination in social, economic, and political
arenas by identifying distinct themes about the meanings of race in discrimination
cases). But cf PATRICIAJ. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 22-28 (1991)
(arguing that norms embedded in criminal and administrative law and doctrine ap-
plied in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause fail to address concrete daily dilem-
mas of homeless or impoverished blacks).
26 See generally Gewirtz, supra note 23, at 614-17 (discussing the proper judicial re-
sponse to white resistance to school desegregation).
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resistance to the desegregation of public facilities in Birmingham,
white mobs' mauling of students who attempted to desegregate inter-
state transportation during the "Freedom Rides," the Montgomery
church bombing-involved violent resistance to civil rights cam-
paigns.2 ' The trend in scholarship and among commentators to rely
on this paradigm was encouraged when, even in the putatively more
racially liberal North, the most famous desegregation case-the Bos-
ton litigation-conformed to the archetype, with whites from South
Boston replacing whites from the Deep South as antagonists.
Since scholars routinely extrapolated from this violence-inflected
racial paradigm to make points about law and American race rela-
tions, it is not surprising that legal reasoning about race has not fo-
cused on subtleties such as intraracial dynamics. Nevertheless, this Ar-
ticle takes the position that the elision of intraracial social dynamics,
including class differences, as a topic of scholarly analysis should not
of necessity follow from the continuing reality of white resistance to
black equality.
29
There is another, complementary explanation for legal scholars'
failure to grapple analytically with class. Legal doctrine overdeter-
mines understandings of the nature of the right to equal protection
and appropriate remedies for denial of this right. In other words, the
literature's racial reductionism follows from the central doctrinal con-
ventions of constitutional law. In particular, this reductionism flows
from the reality that while race is deemed a suspect classification in
constitutional jurisprudence, 30 wealth is not3' (although equal protec-
27 See generally ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, To REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 57-84,
11140, 225-52 (1987) (describing these three incidents).
28 See RONALD P. FORMISANO, BOSTON AGAINST BUSING: RACE, CLASS AND
ETHNICITY IN THE 1960s AND 1970s, at 114-15, 122-24, 143-45, 150, 153, 161, 185-86,
204-05, 212, 228 (1991) (depicting the Boston riots as the result of racial and class con-
flict).
29 See JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 18, 22, 27-30, 180 (1984) (discussing white
attitudes toward desegregation); RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY
YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 16-17, 42-43, 94-96, 158-61, 169, 173, 175, 182, 193-
96, 203, 205, 239-40, 246-48 (1984) (chronicling white flight associated with desegrega-
tion from which the consolidated cases known as Brown v. Board of Education arose).
30 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944) (pronouncing race-
based classifications "suspect," but upholding the internment of people of Japanese
ancestry during World War lI on the basis of war powers).
31 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973) (rejecting
a claim that a state's school-financing system resulting in immense disparities in per-
pupil funding between richer and poorer districts violated the Constitution).
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tion and due process protections are afforded to indigents who are
subject to the deprivation of government benefits32 or penalties of a
criminal nature).33 Since class is not recognized as relevant to adjudi-
catory and interpretative norms in the doctrine, commentators have
ignored the relevance of class relations to the social realities of liti-
gants, including racial minorities."
Whatever the reasons for the analytical oversight, the legal litera-
ture's exceptionalism is mistaken. In reifying the doctrinal fiction that
wealth is an inconsequential category of analysis, the legal literature
obfuscates a social relation that greatly constrains the life choices of
the doctrinally recognized suspect racial classes. Given the role of so-
cioeconomic status in marking an individual's place in the social hier-
archy and poverty's role in African Americans' oppression historically,
it is critical that legal scholars and historians consider the relevance of
class in a variety of contexts, including the civil rights class action.
II. A CONTESTED SETTLEMENT
Bell's Serving Two Masters, while seminal in the legal literature for
its suggestion that the socioeconomic status of LDF's constituents
overwhelmed its clients' remedial preferences, mischaracterized the
nature of the impact of class relations on the legal decision-making
process. Bell's thesis was premised on his opposition to further efforts
by LDF to seek remedies primarily focused on pupil integration. This
Article's detailed analysis of social and economic dynamics in one of
32 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (ruling. that welfare pay-
ments may not be terminated without a pretermination hearing); cf Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (holding that, where a state has established a system of free pub-
lic education, an enrolled student may not be dismissed from school for disciplinary
reasons without a fairness hearing).
33 See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971) (deciding that transcript
fees may not impede indigent criminal defendants' rights to defend themselves);
Douglas v. California, 372 US. 353, 357 (1963) (holding that equal protection is vio-
lated when an indigent defendant appears without counsel in her first appeal of a
criminal conviction).
3' This is not to say that scholars have not suggested affirmative doctrinal recogni-
tion of socioeconomic disadvantage; some have, most notably during the 1970s. See,
e.g., Frank I. Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARv. L. REv. 7, 38-39 (1969) (arguing that courts should guarantee each person a
minimum allocation for her basic needs). See generally Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUtB. AFF. 107, 171 (1976) (advocating a "group disad-
vantaging principle" that wotld take better account of the social realities of those pro-
tected by the Equal Protection Clause than conventional antidiscrimination norms and
doctrine).
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the three cities cited by Bell as evidence for his conclusions suggests,
however, that his argument lacked empirical support in important re-
spects.
LDF's effort to implement Brown v. Board of Education in Atlanta
was cut short in 1973 when the local NAACP president and a few
other middle-class African American leaders decided to settle Calhoun
v. Cook. 5 The black elite negotiated the settlement with a group of
white business and civic leaders but without the knowledge or consent
of either the majority of plaintiff class members or their attorneys of
36record since 1958, LDF.
The history of this settlement complicates the narrative of interra-
cial cohesion suggested by Bell and recapitulated time and again in
the legal literature. Deep divisions existed among LDF's clients re-
garding the remedy to be pursued, as well as between leaders of the
local NAACP, on the one hand, and the national NAACP and NAACP
LDF, on the other. The end result was a plaintiff class divided in
many ways, including along class lines, with each camp aligned with
separate and competing groups of lawyers.
The historical evidence uncovered in this Article suggests that Bell
was at once correct and incorrect in his assessment of the relevance of
class to decision making in the school desegregation cases. Bell's con-
tention that certain school desegregation actions involved conflict and
ethical dilemmas related to the socioeconomic statuses of decision
makers and clients was correct. Nevertheless, the historical record
supports a correlation between remedial preferences and class that is
significantly different from, and indeed in some ways the opposite of,
that supposed by Bell.
The Atlanta example reveals that both the working-class and mid-
dle-class African Americans (and whites) who participated in the At-
lanta litigation demonstrated "double consciousness"-both racial
and class consciousness-rather than a monolithic racial perspective
on appropriate strategies, tactics, and remedies. Working-class cli-
35 451 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
36 See infra Part II.B (describing the settlement negotiations).
37 The allusion to "double consciousness" is a play on W.E.B. Du Bois's words from
his classic work, The SouL. of Black Folk, in which he wrote:
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always look-
ing at one's self through the eyes of others .... One ever feels his two-
ness[]-an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone
keeps it from being torn asunder.
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ents did not uniformly oppose racial-balance orders, and school inte-
gration was not advocated and imposed by a unified group of middle-
class decision makers from outside of the city. s Moreover, the conflict
that marred the proceedings in Calhoun was not only between lawyers
and clients but also among members of the plaintiff class, as well as
between LDF lawyers and lawyers hired by the local NAACP chapter to
subvert LDF's racial-balance plan. Power relations of various sorts
were at work; hence, this was not solely the paradigmatic battle of
whites against blacks and rich versus poor that Bell implied.
Bell was most misguided in his assumption that middle-class blacks
influenced LDF to support racial-balance orders on the basis of a
blind faith in the ideology of integration. In Atlanta, middle-class
blacks and whites tended to oppose rather than support desegregation
of schools. 39 They did so to protect black middle-class employment in-
terests and to preserve a select group of segregated, but highly re-
garded, schools that catered to the children of Atlanta's African
American elite. Furthermore, to the extent that the African American
leadership offered an ideological justification for their remedial pref-
erences, it was black nationalist rather than integrationist. The lead-
ers opposed a remedy focused on pupil integration because of their
faith that black educators and administrators could ameliorate educa-
tional problems in all-black schools without whites' involvement in
school governance matters.
Bell also was incorrect in his assumption that the working class
and poor embraced a simple and uniform solution to the problem of
inferior schools. Opinions among working-class members of the
plaintiff class were not uniform. The working class tended either to
support LDF's desegregation plan, to be critical of all legal processes
and skeptical of the efficacy of legal norms to improve the quality of
black students' educational opportunities, or to be unaware of, or not
to voice an opinion about, the settlement at all. 40 The working class
W.E. BURGHARDT Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 3 (7th ed., A.C. McClurg & Co.
1907) (1903). Whereas Du Bois's "double consciousness" referred to the psychic wea-
riness created by slavery and segregation, I use the term to refer to the interplay of
race- and class-based disadvantage and its impact on the African American working
class and poor.
38 See infra Part II.B.2, D.2-3 (addressing varied working-class and upper-class opin-
ions of the settlement, and describing the settlement's negotiators).
39 See infra Part II.D.2-3 (relating the testimony of various Atlanta residents in sup-
port of and in opposition to the Calhoun settlement).
40 See infra Part II.D.4 (noting the low rate of black Atlantans' participation in the
settlement hearings and the reasons for their silence).
RACE AS 1DENT TY CARICATURE
and poor thus held varied opinions, and many were disaffected from
and uninvolved in the legal process.
Nevertheless, the Atlanta narrative reveals intraracial tension
about the school desegregation issue that was predicated in part on
class consciousness. Specifically, civil rights lawyers' efforts in Atlanta
were constrained by the assumption of local middle-class black elites
that they should determine the appropriate tactics, strategies, and
goals of the campaign to implement Brown.4' Neither lawyers from
New York nor local African Americans would alter the elites' determi-
nation, forged by their identity as the "Talented Tenth," to control the
terms and conditions under which the entire black community would
experience law's equal protection in the realm of public education.42
Theirs was a considered judgment held for many years.
Beginning in the years following World War II, a small group of
Atlanta's middle-class black population determined that politics was a
particularly fruitful avenue for addressing civil rights concerns. In-
deed, the black elite preferred resolving racial problems through pri-
vately negotiated settlements, or "gentlemen's agreements," with the
43white elite and through the electoral process. In particular, the elite
placed great faith in the efficacy of bloc voting in mayoral elections.
After influencing which candidate won the mayoralty, the African
American elite would then work behind closed doors to put pressure
on him and other municipal officials to ameliorate problems faced by
blacks, such as shortages in housing, inadequate healthcare, and infe-
rior schooling. They viewed formal legal processes as secondary to
these formal and informal political processes as tools for mediating
racial disputes.44
As a result of the black elite's allegiance to this combination of
formal and informal politics as the primary means of achieving civil
41 See infta notes 85 and accompanying text (discussing the decision of the self-
appointed leaders to hold settlement negotiations in secret).
42 See W.E.B. Du Bois, The Talented Tenth, in THE NEGRO PROBLEM 33, 33 (AMS
Press 1970) (1903) ("The problem of education, then, among Negroes must first of all
deal with the Talented Tenth; it is the problem of developing the Best of this race that
they may guide the Mass away from the contamination and death of the Worst, in their
own and other races.").
43 See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Class Actions: The Impact of Black and Middle-Class
Conservatism on Civil Rights Lawyering in a New South Political Economy, Atlanta,
1946-1979 ch. 2 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University) (on file with
the Duke University Library) (discussing the "Atlanta style of biracial negotiation" and
its impact on the pace and nature of the civil rights movement in Atlanta).
See id. at 46-56 (describing African Americans' voting efforts in Georgia and
their effects on Georgia politics).
20031 1927
1928 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA IAWREVIEW [Vol. 151:1913
rights gains, law was not the primary means through which public val-
ues regarding race relations were shaped in post-War Atlanta, includ-
ing during the most critical phases of the civil rights movement. This
reality was a crucial determinant of the path taken by LDF's campaign
to implement Brown in Atlanta. The perceived commonality of iden-
tity and interests between members of the black and white middle
classes, or within the "biracial elite"-in particular, the members'
preference for using negotiated settlement to address race-related
disputes-undermined the willingness and ability of LDF's clients to
contest racial inequality through the courts. Ultimately, the extralegal
processes favored by the elite served to delay or impede social change
through law. This was true even after the Supreme Court issued deci-
sions that empowered federal courts to become increasingly proactive
in dismantling segregated schools, as the following sections show.
A. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
as the Precipitate for Settlement
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,45 the Supreme
Court addressed the question of how school districts should comply
with their obligation to operate unitary schools in large urban school
systems where freedom-of-choice plans were inadequate to achieve de-
segregation and residential segregation was endemic. Justice Warren
Burger's opinion for the Court in Swann established a presumption
that single-race schools were unconstitutional 46 and articulated the
view that federal judges possessed broad equitable powers to issue re-
medial orders to achieve desegregated schools. 47 In particular, the
unanimous Court endorsed the use of racial ratios in formulating de-
segregation plans and, recognizing the relationship between residen-
tial and school segregation, held that officials could gerrymander
school attendance zones and bus students between noncontiguous at-
tendance zones to achieve pupil integration. 48 As a result of Swann,
45 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
46 See id. at 18 ("Independent of student assignment, where it is possible to identify
a 'white school' or 'Negro school' simply by reference to the racial composition of
teachers and staff... a primafacie case of violation of substantive constitutional rights
under the Equal Protection Clause is shown.").
47 Id. at 16-17.
48 Id. at 16-19, 25-32. For a discussion of the negotiations among the Justices that
occurred during the process of formulating the Court's final opinion in Swann, see
DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READING, WRITING, AND RACE: THE DESEGREGATION OF THE
CHARLOTrE SCHOOLS 206-14 (1995).
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federal district court judges ordered school systems across the South
to use the tools legitimated in the case-specifically busing and rezon-
ing-to achieve pupil integration! '
Swann posed significant difficulties for Atlanta's biracial leader-
ship. These leaders had assumed that by submitting to a voluntary de-
segregation plan, one based on students' preferences as to where to
attend school, they had met their obligation to comply with Brown. In
their minds, Atlanta had weathered the school desegregation crisis
with the city's reputation for racial progressiveness and the traditional
patterns of segregation in schools and residential areas intact.5° Swann
threatened the biracial leadership's assumption that Atlanta had
emerged unscathed by the turbulence experienced in other cities.
As a result, a biracial group of business and civic leaders, only one
of whom was a plaintiff in the desegregation suit but most of whom
were defendants, determined to respond to Swann in a manner that
would head off the possibility that the decision would unravel the
city's relative racial equanimity. The group achieved its goal in two
steps: first, through a series of legal maneuvers that disavowed the
significance LDF attributed to Swann and delayed the implementation
of a new desegregation plan consistent with it; and second, by agree-
ing to settle the case in a manner that allowed the city to avoid com-
plying with Swann altogether."'
49 See DOUGLAS, sufpra note 48, at 212 ("McMillan's order became a benchmark
that many other federal judges sought to emulate."); see also JACK GREENBERG,
CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 388-89 (1994) (relating the author's post-Swann filings of
Swann motions in all pending cases and recognizing that "thoroughgoing desegrega-
tion became widespread").
1,0 Susan M. McGrath, Great Expectations: The History of School Desegregation
in Atlanta and Boston, 1954-1990, at 219 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Emory University) (on file with author); see Edward Peeks, Significance of Decision Aired
by City Leaders, ATLANTA DAILY WORLD, May 18, 1954, at 1 (recognizing that the current
housing situation would "tend to hold Negro students in schools in their communities
and whites in theirs"); Segregation to Continue, School Officials Predict, ATLANTA DAILY
WORLD, May 18, 1954, at 1; see also Samuel Adams, Housing Cited as Factor in School De-
segregation, ATLANTA DAILY WORLD, Nov. 10, 1955, at I ("[H]ousing is and will con-
tinue to be the controlling factor that will keep the schools separate for a long time.").
On policies that resulted in and perpetuated residential segregation in Atlanta over
time, see RONALD H. BAYOR, RACE AND THE SIHJAPING OF TWENTIETI-CENTURY ATLANTA
53-85, 235, 237, 245, 251 (1996).
51 See infra Part II.B-E (discussing the settlement, its terms, the questionable cir-
cumstances leading to it, and various reactions to it).
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In view of Swann, LDF appealed an earlier finding by the federal
district court that Atlanta's school system was unitary5' and prevailed.
In an October 10, 1971, order, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals va-
cated the district court's order finding unitariness and ordered the
court to allow the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to present a de-
segregation plan that utilized the desegregation techniques sanc-
tioned in Swann.55
On December 30, 1971, LDF submitted its desegregation plan to
the district court. LDF's plan was aimed at remedying statistics show-
ing that, in 1971, 42.4% of Atlanta's elementary students and 50.7% of
its high school students attended schools in which 99% of the students
were of the same race. These statistics were partly a result of spatial
segregation: whites lived at the northern and southern ends of the
city whereas African Americans lived in a broad middle section of At-
lanta.5 4 LDF's plan eliminated all one-race schools in the district usingS 55
all of the Swann techniques. Given the extent of "white flight" from
the city, however, the ratios of African American students in many
schools were high even under LDF's plan. For instance, under LDF's
proposal, the student body of the Harper Elementary School would be
84.9% African American. 5" Even where noncontiguous schools were
grouped, the percentage of blacks in the student body ranged from
66% to 80% under LDF's approach.57 Thus, the effect of LDF's pro-
52 See Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804, 809 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (finding no evi-
dence of dejure segregation and therefore determining that "[i]t appears to be a uni-
tary system 'within which no person is effectively excluded from any school because of
race or color"' (quoting Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20
(1969) (per curiam))).
53 Calhoun v. Cook, 451 F.2d 583, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); see BAYOR,
supra note 50, at 244-45 (noting the Fifth Circuit's reversal of the district court's find-
ing that Atlanta "had done all that it could" except for large-scale busing); cf Calhoun,
332 F. Supp. at 809-10 (addressing the applications of Swann utilized to date and the
additional need "for a sweeping examination of its relationship to housing, planning,
finances, rapid transit and all the other external factors which vitally affect [public
education's] role in the community").
54 Calhoun, 332 F. Supp. at 806.
55 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing Swann's holding that
single race schools were unconstitutional and federal judges had broad equitable pow-
ers to issue remedial orders).
56 See Plaintiffs' Motion for Adoption of Plaintiffs' Proposed Desegregation Plan
and for Other Relief, at app. ser. I, Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ga.
1973) (No. 6298) (on file with National Archives & Records Administration, Wash.,
D.C. (NARA), case file, box 55, folder 3) (hereinafter Plaintiffs' Proposed Desegrega-
tion Plan] (charting the racial composition of certain elementary schools under the
plaintiffs' proposed plan).
57 Id. at app. ser. III.
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posal was relatively modest, resulting in only a small number of Afri-
can American and white students attending school together:
LDF's plan also addressed the issue of faculty and staff assign-
ments. This part of the plan outlined broad principles, declaring, for
instance, that seniority would govern the dismissal or demotion of in-
dividuals within any professional class of employment; that those dis-
missed or demoted should be considered for any other positions
available in the district for which they were qualified; and that hiring
and promotion would be governed by "reasonable, nondiscriminatory
and reviewable standards and procedures."9  Moreover, LDF's pro-
posal required that the ratio of black to white employees in profes-
sional positions approximate the ratio of black to white teachers in the
school system, as mandated by the Fifth Circuit's two-year-old decision
in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District '0 Finally, LDF's
plan included a provision requiring the district to submit reports on a
biannual basis setting forth data to demonstrate its compliance with
the plan's goals regarding student, faculty, and staff desegregation. 6'
Because the Supreme Court (in Swann, Green v. County School
Board,62 and Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education63) and the
Fifth Circuit (in Singleton, United States v. Jefferson County Board of Educa-
tion,64 and prior orders in Calhoun itself) had already found each of
the elements of LDF's plan constitutional, its proposal was not contro-
58 See id. at app. (detailing projected results of a plan that would still leave most
schools with a black population greater than seventy percent).
59 Id. at app. (Staff Desegregation).
See Singleton v.Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 419 F.2d 1211, 1218 (5th Cir.
1969) (requiring for the 1969-1970 school year that the ratio of black to white staff
members be substantially the same as that of black to white teachers); see also Singleton
v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 426 F.2d 1364, 1365 n.2 (5th Cir. 1970) (adopting
the earlier Singleton faculty-staff assignment ratio as the standard for a unitary system).
61 Plaintiffs' Proposed Desegregation Plan, supra note 56, at app. (Staff Desegrega-
tion); cf Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9-10, Calhoun
(No. 6298) (on file with NARA, case file, box 55, folder 3) (stating that plaintiffs' cal-
culations of the racial composition of Atlanta's schools were based on annual reports
submitted by defendants to the federal government, as required by law).
62 See 391 U.S. 430, 439-41 (1968) (holding that freedom-of-choice plans that did
not produce unitary school systems were constitutionally inadequate).
See 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam) ("[C]ontinued operation of segregated
schools under a standard of allowing 'all deliberate speed' for desegregation is no
longer constitutionally permissible.... [E]very school district is to terminate dual
school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools.").
See 380 F.2d 385, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (holding that school dis-
tricts have an affirmative duty to desegregate and racial ratios are appropriate rules of
thumb for measuring the effectiveness of a school desegregation plan).
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versial as a matter of law. Hence, the response of the board of educa-
tion to LDF's proposal did not focus on the law as such. Rather, it at-
tacked the scale of the proposal, characterizing it as a "mass busing
plan.' 5 The board claimed that, in Atlanta, busing students would be
impractical, disruptive, and prohibitively expensive because the city
did not own any school buses. (This contention was a partial truth,
however, since the convention in Atlanta was that thousands of stu-
dents traveled to school through an arrangement with a private city
transit system at reduced fares.)
tC6
At the same time as the board vehemently objected to busing, the
defendants offered LDF what the board undoubtedly viewed as an ol-
ive branch-namely, a school board resolution that affirmed its com-
mitment to increasing the number of African American administra-
tors in the school system. The board promised to "increas[e] the
number of Blacks in key positions" by "increasing the number of
available key positions."'' It further proclaimed: "In order to perfect
a better racial balance in key positions now held mainly by Whites,
needed new positions will be created for Blacks immediately, and, fur-
ther, it will be the policy of this Board to fill the places that become
vacant with Blacks until the imbalance in this area is corrected."8
Thus, whereas the board objected to additional expenditures for
transporting students to achieve desegregation, itjumped at the oppor-
tunity to fund new positions for black professionals. In fact, employ-
ing rhetoric more consistent with a separate but equal system than
with Brown, the defendants stated that "[i] n each functional responsi-
bility there will be both Black and White schools, faculty and serv-
ices."6:I
The board's response to LDF's proposal drew a line in the sand.
Its strategy pitted two complementary goals-pupil integration and
equal employment opportunities for school faculty and administra-
tion-against each other. Although both goals were legally mandated,
the defendants offered to honor the rights of only one of two sub-
groups of the African American population. Teachers and adminis-
trators could win or students could win-but not both.
65 Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Alternate Plan for Further Desegregation at
2-5, Calhoun (No. 6298) (on file with NARA, case file, box 55, folder 3).
66 Id. at 4-5.
67 Id. at 10.
68 /d. at 11.
69 Id. at 10.
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After hearing evidence from the parties on the propriety of LDF's
plan and listening to the defendants' objections, the district court
sided with the school board.70 Even though they acknowledged the
school board's claim that Atlanta owned no buses as an irrelevant con-
sideration under binding precedent, Judges Sidney Smith and Albert
Henderson Jr. rejected LDF's plan as "unreasonable."71 The court's
ruling was based on its determination that segregation in the system
resulted from "de facto forces completely beyond its control, primarily
in terms of housing, population shifts, and the resegregation proc-
ess." 72 Rather than considering that the Supreme Court approved the
Swann remedies precisely because of the interrelationship of such fac-
tors, the court rejected LDF's proposal. Paradoxically, the complex
ways in which racial discrimination had been perpetuated in Atlanta
over the years proved to be constitutionally advantageous to the per-
petrators.
The LDF lawyers were undaunted. A few weeks after the district
court issued the order rejecting LDF's desegregation plan and finding
the Atlanta school system unitary, LDF made a three-pronged attack
in pursuit of its remedial vision. It appealed the district court's June
1972 order to the circuit court; made a motion to consolidate Calhoun
with two school desegregation suits pending in Fulton and Dekalb
counties (suburban districts surrounding Atlanta) and to amend its
complaint by adding certain Georgia state actors, including housing
authorities, as defendants; and rebuffed the school board's overture
regarding black staff positions.7 3 The first two initiatives were in keep-
ing with LDF's already clear intention to press on in its pursuit of a
pupil desegregation decree consistent with Swann. By contrast, the
clarity of its statement objecting to the defendants' offer to increase
black administrative positions was new and especially poignant. In a
July 1972 brief, LDF showed its resolve to attain a remedy "with teeth"
for what it alleged was continued faculty and staff segregation in At-
70 See Calhoun v. Cook, No. 6298 (N.D. Ga. June 8, 1972) (denying plaintiffs' pro-
posed desegregation plan).
71 Id. at 10-11, 15-16.
72 Id. at 11.
73 Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal, Calhoun v. Cook (5th Cir. filedJune 23, 1972) (No.
72-2453) (on file with NARA, case file, box 55, folder 2); Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Calhoun v. Cook, 469 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1972) (No. 72-2453) (on file with NAACP
Papers, Library of Congress, Wash., D.C. (NAACP Papers), part V, box 682); Supple-
mental and Amended Complaint, Calhoun (No. 6298) (on file with NARA, case file,
box 55, folder 2).
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lanta's school system.7 4 In response to the school board's resolution
promising to increase the number of African Americans in "key posi-
tions," LDF argued:
Nothing will be rectified by assigning Blacks to new "Black"jobs created
especially for them; the proper remedy lies in [e]nsuring Black profes-
sional personnel their natural and rightful place in the upper levels of
administration in the Atlanta School System. This result will be accom-
plished, not by broad statements of policy,... but by the creation of a
procedure by which Blacks may first become aware of administrative staff
openings, and then compete for such openings on the basis of their pro-
fessional qualifications and experience in the Atlanta Public School Sys-
75
tern.
B. Secret Settlement Negotiations Begin
1. LDF and the ACLU's Reading of Swann Inspires an Insurgency
LDF's aggressive litigation stance caused considerable consterna-
tion among Atlanta's biracial elite. They found LDF's unwillingness
to accept the school board's settlement offer regarding faculty and
administrative hiring particularly gauling. As a result, the elites began
planning in July 1972 to intercede in the case and bring it to an end.
Other factors were also at work in the elites' escalating concern
about the desegregation litigation. On June 8, 1972, the same day
that the district court declared that the school board was not respon-
sible for remedying persistent school segregation in Atlanta because it
was the result of housing patterns and other circumstances beyond
the board's control, Margie Hames, an Atlanta attorney affiliated with
the Georgia chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
filed a lawsuit on behalf of twenty-six low-income African Americans
(almost all women) that was predicated on precisely the opposite ar-
gument. T' At its most elemental level, the theory behind Armour v. Nix
was that the relationship between school and residential segregation
could be proven." Specifically, Hames set out to prove that a series of
74 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Staff Desegregation Proposal at 3, Calhoun
(No. 6298) (on file with NARA, case file, box 55, folder 2).
75 Id. at4.
76 Armour v. Nix, Civ. No. 16708, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9609 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 24,
1979).
77 See id. at *39.40 ("Plaintiffs have presented the ingenious argument that past
segregative acts on the part of school officials contributed to the formation of housing
patterns which caused segregation in the schools today.").
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intentional acts by state and local officials and entities, such as school
boards, on the one hand, and quasi-public and private officials and
entities, such as the Metropolitan Planning Commission and real es-
tate agencies, on the other, had produced Atlanta's pattern of racially
identifiable schools and neighborhoods. In light of this conspiracy's
scope, the ACLU sought a broad-based remedy-in particular, a pupil
desegregation decree fashioned without regard to the reality of white
flight from Atlanta's city limits. Hames requested a metropolitan-wide
desegregation plan-one in which local school boards across the six
regions encompassing the city of Atlanta and the surrounding suburbs
would operate jointly, or as a "federation," for purposes of pupil at-
tendance and a limited number of related activities."'
This unsettling combination-LDF's uncompromising stance in
Calhoun regarding both pupil as well as faculty and administrative in-
tegration, and the ACLU's new effort through the Armour lawsuit to
create a federated school system-inspired Atlanta's elite biracial de-
cision makers to take action. As a result of these developments, elite
whites and blacks renewed settlement discussions, which had first be-
gun in 1971 on the heels of the Fifth Circuit decision that opened the
door to Swann-type remedies in Atlanta.
2. The Insurgent Elite Devises a Plan to Upset the Civil
Rights Lawyers' Strategy
In the style that had been typical of the Atlanta biracial power
structure since the post-War era, businessmen and civic leaders held
their negotiations about the school desegregation settlement in secret.
Those in attendance at the secret sessions included white and black
elites who opposed a Swann remedy. The whites included two school
board members and Calhoun defendants, Frank Smith and William
VanLandingham, also Executive Vice President of the Citizens and
Southern Bank. Even more remarkably, the white negotiators in-
cluded Griffin Bell, a former partner at the premier Atlanta law firm
King & Spalding and a sitting federal appellate courtjudge; and John
Letson, who, as superintendent of the Atlanta school board during the
78 For discussions of the plaintiffs' proposed plans, see Plaintiffs' Proposed Find-
ings of Fact (filed Oct. 24, 1977), Armour (Civ. No. 16708) (on file with NAACP Papers,
part V, box 659); Gene Guerrero, Atlanta Schools: The Case for Metro Relief, ACLU MAG.,
Apr. 1975 (on file with Pauley Papers, Emory University Library, Atlanta, Ga. (Pauley
Papers), box 29, folder 1); Memorandum from Roger Mills, Attorney, ACLU, to Gene
Guerrero, Executive Director, ACLU of Georgia, et al. (Apr. 1975) (on file with Pauley
Papers, box 17, folder 5).
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1960s, had encouraged whites to flee Atlanta's public schools. The
primary African American negotiators were Lonnie King, president of
the Atlanta branch of the NAACP and a former leader of the student
movement; Lyndon Wade, Executive Director of the Atlanta Urban
League and chairman of the "biracial committee" appointed by the
district court in Calhoun; Benjamin Mays, former president of More-
house College and, as a member and president of the school board, a
Calhoun defendant; and finally, Jessie Hill Jr., of the Atlanta Life In-
surance Company, who had joined the school desegregation suit as a
plaintiff in 1967.
Judge Bell's starring role in the settlement negotiations gave the
proposal legitimacy but later proved controversial. Bell orchestrated
the discussions by explaining the significance of the Fifth Circuit's
June order and other recent precedents at a private meeting of At-
lanta's movers and shakers."s In light of these rulings, the judge ad-
vised the men that dilatory tactics were no longer legally feasible but
that the elite could best the court, and avoid the imposition of metro-
politan relief in Atlanta, by moving Calhoun beyond the court's pur-
view.8" Bell recommended settling the case, and doing so without the
involvement of the attorneys of record-the plaintiffs' lawyers, in par-
79 Hill was the only black negotiator who was also a party to the case. For more
background on the meetings and the participants, see Motion to Reconsider at 1-3,
Calhoun (No. 6298) (on file with NARA, case file, box 53, folder 7) [hereinafter Mo-
tion to Reconsider]; CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME POLITICS 64 (1989). See also DAVID
ANDREW HARMON, BENEATH THE IMAGE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND RACE
RELATIONs 254-56 (1996) (discussing the secret negotiations between white school
board members and members of the local NAACP, which advocated a position con-
trary to the one put forward by national LDF attorneys);Junie Brown, Staffers Join School
Talks, ATLANTAJ., Nov. 14, 1972, at 2A [hereinafter Brown, Staffers Join School Talks]
(reporting that negotiation sessions lasted sixteen hours and Jessie Hill and Lyndon
Wade later met with the entire school board); Beau Cutts, City-NAACP Pact: School
Compromise Sought, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 14, 1972; Mike Raffauf, A Tale of Deals: At-
lanta Desegregation and the Power Structure, GREAT SPECKLED BIRD, Mar. 19, 1973, at 4 (at-
tacking Lonnie King and the secretly negotiated compromise plan); Minutes of Meet-
ing with Atlanta Branch Officers in New York at 11 (Mar. 6, 1973) (on file with NAACP
Papers, box 685). Letson was removed from the settlement talks after his participation
was reported in the press. SeeJunie Brown, Letson Taken out of School Plan Bid, ATLANTA
J., Nov. 15, 1972, at 1A (reporting that Dr.John Letson was taken out of negotiations at
the NAACP's request).
80 See HARMON, supra note 79, at 254 (noting thatJudge Bell was the guest speaker
at a meeting of the Atlanta Action Forum, consisting of white and African American
business leaders, where he spoke about school desegregation legal precedents and
urged members to negotiate an out-of-court settlement).
Id.
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ticular. Since Bell's remarks were made out of the public view and
only later divulged, his ethics were not questioned at the time, even
though he was a sitting Fifth Circuit judge advising a group to settle
Calhoun in a manner that impeded the Fifth Circuit's command that
Swann-type remedies be considered in Atlanta. (Later, when he was
nominated by President Jimmy Carter to be U.S. Attorney General,
Bell came under fire from the national NAACP, the ACLU, and the
Congressional Black Caucus for his role in the negotiations. Leaders
of these groups alleged that his activities, at the very least, represented
a potential conflict of interest and probably constituted a serious
breach of judicial ethics. These charges did not impede his appoint-
ment.)
8
3
Neither the plaintiffs' attorneys nor the general public were aware
that a settlement was being discussed until the fall of 1972. At that
time, the Atlanta Journal reported that an unidentified but "impecca-
ble" source had divulged that secret negotiations were taking place.8
The source explained that those involved in the negotiations-includ-
ing members of the school board required by Georgia's open meeting
(or "sunshine") law to meet in public-would be excluded from fur-
ther meetings if they divulged information about the talks to anyone
outside the circle of self-appointed negotiators.85
The negotiators set their sights on defeating the efforts of LDF
and ACLU attorneys to bring about a metropolitan-wide school deseg-
82 Id.
83 Bell's entire record in civil rights cases while on the bench was considered
"mixed," at best; in addition, his membership in Atlanta clubs that excluded Jews and
Blacks-clubs from which he initially refused to resign-caused outrage in the civil
rights community and beyond. For discussions of the negotiation, Bell's actions, and
his subsequent career, see Motion for Recusal of judge Griffin Bell at 1-3, Armour v.
Nix, Civ. No. 16708, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9609 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 1979) (on file with
NARA, case file, box 55, folder 5); HARMON, supra note 79, at 253-55; Ex-U.S. Appeals
Judge Is Reported Chosen as Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1976, at Al; Thomas A.
Johnson, Black Caucus Uneasy over Carter Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1976, at A25;John
P. MacKenzie, Griffin Bell on and off U.S. Bench: A Litigating Lawyer and a Negotiator,
WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1976, at A] 8.
84 Cutts, supra note 79.
85 Id.; see also Brown, Staffers Join School Talks, supra note 79 ("[Board members]
were told if they talked to news reporters they would be excluded from further nego-
tiations."). For Georgia's "sunshine" laws-requiring certain government meetings to
be open to the public-in effect during the negotiation period, see GA. CODE ANN. §
23-802 (1966); 1972 Ga. Laws 575. See also McLarty v. Board of Regents, 200 S.E.2d 117
(Ga. 1973) (noting that the purpose of Georgia's Open Meetings Act was to eliminate
"closed meetings which engender in the people a distrust of its officials who are
clothed with the power to act in their name").
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regation plan. An October 6, 1972, ruling by the Fifth Circuit ensured
that the negotiators' objective would be no simple task. 6 In its Octo-
ber ruling, the Fifth Circuit again reversed the district court's declara-
tion that the Atlanta school system was unitary. Furthermore, the
court ordered the implementation of a desegregation plan in which
the "fear of white flight" was not "utilized as a factor" in design, segre-
gated schools were paired or grouped in accordance with Swann, and
817transportation was provided to students as needed .
Another ruling, issued during this time by Judge Griffin Bell, was
equally significant. Bell became formally and publicly involved in Cal-
houn in the weeks after the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
finding of unitariness in his capacity as a member of a three-judge
panel presiding over that part of Calhoun (regarding metropolitan-
wide relief) that had been consolidated with the ACLU's Armour suit.
On November 17, 1972, Bell and his colleagues issued an order stay-
ing the proceedings in Armour on the theory that cases involving met-
ropolitan relief pending in other circuit courts might impact ajudge's
88opinion regarding the advisability of metropolitan relief in Atlanta.
Bell's reasoning regarding the propriety of granting a stay was reason-
able on its face. However, the immediate impact of the stay was to buy
time for those wishing to resolve Calhoun in a manner that removed
Swann-type remedies from consideration. Once Calhoun was settled
absent a consideration of metropolitan relief, the practical effect
would be to prevent the Atlanta school system-the only one of the six
districts involved in Armour that included a majority black popula-
tion-from being a part of the federated school system proposed by
the ACLU. s"
86 Calhoun v. Cook, No. 72-2453 (5th Cir. Oct. 6, 1972) (on file with NARA, case
file, box 55, folder 1).
87 See id. at 1-3 (ordering the Atlanta public school system to proceed with deseg-
regation, outlining guidelines and conditions, and recognizing that success would be
dependent on both sides' full cooperation with the spirit and letter of the court's or-
der).
8s Armour v. Nix, No. 16708, at 1-3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 17, 1972) (on file with NARA,
case file, box 55, folder 1). The cases involving metropolitan relief arose in Detroit,
Richmond, and Denver.
89 Margie Hames argued that the stay was improper and should be lifted. Brief in
Support of Motion to Vacate Stay at 1-5, Armour (No. 16708) (on file with NARA, case
file, box 55, folder 1).
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3. LDF Is Expelled from Its Own Case
With the stay in place, the negotiators turned to the singularly
most important and spectacular of the series of events that resulted in
the settlement of the school desegregation case: LDF was expelled
from its own case. Lonnie King, president of the Atlanta NAACP
chapter, engineered the removal of LDF attorney James Nabrit III
from the Calhoun litigation. In November of 1972-after the U.S. Su-
preme Court refused to stay the Fifth Circuit's order to the school dis-
trict to implement a comprehensive desegregation plan9 ° and Nabrit
denounced the ongoing settlement talks' exclusion of LDF-King
maneuvered his way into the litigation and froze Nabrit out.
King did so by obtaining powers of attorney from eight of the
twenty-eight original Calhoun plaintiffs. Then, acting as these plain-
tiffs' legal representative, King fired Nabrit and hired attorney Benja-
min Spaulding-a novice in comparison to Nabrit-to replace LDF
attorneys as plaintiffs' counsel. King claimed that Nabrit was fired af-
ter consultation with the plaintiffs, who enthusiastically supported
LDF's removal. With that, LDF was ousted from its own case, deposed
by a man whose role as chief decision maker for the plaintiffs was self-
appointed and whose putative constituency was, at best, unrepresenta-
tive of the plaintiff class as a whole and, at worst, nonexistent. 91
King's ability to exercise such a powerful influence over the case
can be traced to the decades-long demise of the Atlanta branch of the
NAACP. The branch had fewer than 2000 members in 1966, despite a
wide-ranging campaign to increase its membership to a respectable
level after it dropped to a record low of twenty-four in 1964, according
to one report. The Atlanta NAACP was considered virtually defunct
90 See Cook v. Calhoun, 409 U.S. 974, 974 (1972) (denying the application for a
stay).,
Interview with Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, Counsel, LDF, 1971-1974, in Madi-
son, Wis. (Sept. 9, 2000); see Calhoun v. Cook, 469 F.2d 1067, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1972)
(per curiam) (listing Benjamin Spaulding as an attorney for the plaintiffs-appellants);
Junie Brown, School Negotiation Could Be Periled, ATLANTA J., Nov. 10, 1972, at IA (re-
porting a "split... between the Atlanta leaders of the [NAACP] and its legal counsel,
[LDF]," and that the split could "jeopardize attempts to settle the Atlanta school de-
segregation case out of court"); Junie Brown, School Plan Accord Seen, ATLANTAJ., Nov.
20, 1972, at 2A (describing a split between Nabrit and local NAACP officials and King's
hiring of Benjamin Spaulding to handle the case); Memorandum from Mercedes
Wright to Nathaniel Jones (Nov. 16, 1972) (on file with NAACP Papers, part V, box
682) (informing Jones that the Executive Committee of the Atlanta NAACP branch
voted to dismiss James Nabrit as attorney of record); Memorandum from Atlanta
Branch NAACP to Ruby Hurley, Director, S.E. Region NAACP (n.d.) (on file with
NAACP Papers, box 684) (detailing the events leading to LDF's dismissal).
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by national NAACP officials, who thought a city of Atlanta's size
should produce 10,000 to 15,000 members. King had secured the
branch presidency in 1968 without formal opposition and despite
procedural irregularities, including voting by inactive or unqualified
members. Indeed, the branch's recordkeeping was so shoddy that it
was impossible to determine with certainty whether voters were mem-
bers in good standing.! Nevertheless, the NAACP's name and cachet
suggested that King, as chapter president, represented a broad and
active constituency. In reality, King represented himself and the few
other black elites, such as Lyndon Wade, Benjamin Mays, and Jessie
Hill Jr., who wanted a swift settlement of the school desegregation liti-
gation-not the Calhoun plaintiff class as a whole. King insinuated
himself into the litigation as the voice of black Atlanta over the objec-
tions of the Armour plaintiffs, LDF, the national NAACP, and the Con-
gress of Racial Equality (CORE). As we shall see below, these objec-
tions were based on evidence that King had committed serious
improprieties-misdeeds that made him unfit to represent the plain-
tiff class.°
C. The Court Considers the Class's Due Process Rights, and LDF
Falters for the Sake of Racial Unity
King could not have accomplished his feat without the court's ap-
proval and, as it turns out, without LDF and ACLU attorneys, who
made tactical blunders in responding to King's power grab. The
drama of King's move to depose LDF as lead plaintiffs' counsel first
played out in court in December of 1972. The issue came before the
Fifth Circuit when King, with Spaulding as his attorney, filed a motion
requesting the removal of LDF as counsel ofrecord and the substitu-
92 On the size of the membership and the national NAACP's projected figures, see
Letter from Gloster B. Current, Director of Branches and Field Administration,
NAACP, to Joe Louis Tucker, Georgia Field Director, NAACP (May 2, 1966) (on file
with NAACP Papers, part IV, C6, 1966-1969 file); Letter from Albert R. Sampson, Ex-
ecutive Secretary, Atlanta Branch NAACP, to Gloster B. Current (Aug. 17, 1964) (on
file with NAACP Papers, C27, 1964-1965 file). On procedural irregularities in the elec-
tion of NAACP officials in 1968, see Letter from Gloster B. Current to Honorable
Donald G. Hollowell (Nov. 19, 1968) (on file with NAACP Papers, part IV, C6, 1968-
1969 file); Letter from Donald G. Hollowell, Executive Director, EEOC, Atlanta Re-
gion, to Gloster Current (Nov. 23, 1968) (on file with NAACP Papers, part IV, C6,
1968-1969 file).
93 Interview with Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, supra note 91; see also Raffauf, supra
note 79, at 2 (stating that King split with LDF and the national NAACP by backing a
compromise settlement that was contrary to the court order and was essentially "sell-
ing-out").
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tion of Spaulding. Rather than acceding to that extraordinary re-
quest, the Fifth Circuit issued an order remanding the motion to the
district court for a hearing. 4 The district court convened the hearing
on December 28, 1972. It was attended by Howard Moore and Eliza-
beth Rindskopf, who represented LDF; Spaulding, in his capacity as
attorney for King and eight of the Calhoun plaintiffs; and Margie
Hames, counsel for the Armour plaintiffs.95 The purpose of the hear-
ing was to determine which attorneys legitimately represented the
Calhoun plaintiff class.9 6
To the apparent astonishment of the district court, Moore and
Spaulding played the roles of amicable co-counsel rather than an-
tagonists during the hearing. The rash of stories that had recently
appeared in the press regarding fissures within the Calhoun class, 9' as
well as Moore's public statements a month earlier describing blacks
who negotiated with the school board as "Uncle Toms" " and the ex-
change of pupil desegregation for administrative jobs as tantamount
to a "slave auction, ' ' ' made the coziness between the two especially
perplexing. Nevertheless, during the hearing Moore and Spaulding
jointly refused to address questions propounded from the bench re-
garding the significance of Spaulding's entry into the case as counsel
for part, rather than all, of the plaintiff class. When Judge Smith im-
plied that Spaulding could not be a legitimate representative of the
entire class because it consisted of the approximately 50,000 African
American children in the school system, rather than only the eight
from whom King had attained powers of attorney, Moore insisted that
these facts presented "no controversy about ... the make up of the
94 Calhoun, 469 F.2d at 1068.
95 See Record of Dec. 28, 1972 at 5, 6, 13, 27, Calhoun v. Cook, No. 72-2453 (N.D.
Ga. 1972) (on file with NAACP Papers, part V, box 684) (recording their comments).
96 See Calhoun, 469 F.2d at 1068 (remanding "to the dlistrict court with directions
to... [h]old such hearings as may be required to enable the Court to determine the
present status of the class or classes in this litigation and the status of legal representa-
tion"); Record of Dec. 28, 1972, sufna note 95, at 2-3 (quoting dialogue between judge
Smith and the defendants' counsel regarding the purpose of the hearing).
97 See Record of Dec. 28, 1972, supra note 95, at 10 (recording Judge Henderson's
comments about the press reports that indicated the lack of harmony in the Fifth Cir-
cuit proceedings).
See Junie Brown, Surprise Lawyer Raps Atlanta Plan in Court: Argument Splinters
Blacks'School Case, ATLANTAJ., Nov. 22, 1972, at 1A (reporting that Moore lambasted a
compromise desegregation plan drafted by school officials and the local NAACP as
one drawn by the white establishment and a group of "Uncle Toms").
99 See Steve Stewart, Court May Draw Own Atlanta Schools Plan, ATI.ANTAJ., Nov. 23,
1972, at 1A (noting that Moore called King's compromise plan "a slave auctioning
himself more or less").
2003]
1942 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYI VANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 151:1913
class, or the relief and scope of the relief which the class seeks."' °
Spaulding no longer wished to substitute counsel, Moore stated, and
had withdrawn the motion; LDF had agreed to add Spaulding as
counsel in the action.' 0'
The court refused to so readily dismiss the Fifth Circuit's concerns
about the plaintiffs' representation, despite Moore and Spaulding's
agreement. Demonstrating concern that proper procedures be fol-
lowed "where some question may arise as to who represents the class,"
Judge Henderson indicated that the members of the class nevertheless
should be notified about developments in the case and perhaps even
be allowed to "bring their own lawyer in" to protect their interests.102
Moore strenuously objected to these suggestions, arguing that no cir-
cumstance had arisen that required notice to the class members.
"That is not... [the] question," Moore said, because "there is no dis-
sension" as to "who counsel are in this case representing the class."'
0
With Moore continuing to argue that he and Spaulding were
authorized to speak for all of the plaintiffs in the case and that there
was no need to provide clients with a forum to voice their views of the
adequacy of their representation, Judges Smith and Henderson began
increasingly to focus on the question of whether LDF attorneys were
dominating the case to the exclusion of their clients. Smith com-
mented that "[t]hese school suits ... are the only cases really run by
the lawyers and not by the class," noting that the judges had not "even
seen a member of the class" because "[t]hey haven't been in the
courtroom, they haven't testified as witnesses or anything." 4
Henderson agreed, arguing that the plaintiffs' lawyers, whether
Moore or Spaulding, were in the "[m]ost envious position in the
world."10 He continued:
I don't know of another lawyer in the whole country that can control
litigation like [it has been] controlled in this case .... I think we would
all have to recognize, to be perfectly honest, that this has always been
litigation controlled by the lawyers and not by the class itself.
1
0
6
The issue was moot, Moore and Spaulding repeated again and again,
because the lawyers had worked out the initial problem among them-
100 Record of Dec. 28, 1972, supra note 95, at 4.
101 Id. at 4-5.
102 Id. at 5.
Id.
104 Id. at 8-9.
o. Id. at 8.
106 Id.
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selves, thereby negating the need for the plaintiffs to become involved
in the litigation. In the end, Moore and Spaulding carried the day:
the court accepted the contention that there was no need to further
pursue the question of whether the plaintiffs were properly and ade-
quately represented or to hear from any plaintiff class members on
the subject.
10 7
Moore's surprising stance was planned, an outgrowth of the na-
tional NAACP's and LDF's desire to avoid the embarrassment of a
prolonged public fight with the Atlanta branch. King and Spaulding
had agreed to present a united front in court, hoping that they could
convince the national groups to allow the branch to pursue a negoti-
ated settlement of the case and perhaps even to join in the negotia-
tions. Still, the strategy was not without controversy. Despite her pri-
vate concerns, Rindskopf, the junior attorney on the case, had been in
no position publicly to disagree with Moore's strategy and thus spent
most of the hearing in silence. Hames failed to challenge the unlikely
alliance between LDF and Spaulding because of a promise of sorts
from Judge Griffin Bell that, however Calhoun was resolved, it would
not affect Hames's suit for metropolitan relief. Even so, Hames-un-
like Moore--did inform the court that she did not and could not
waive the rights of her clients to challenge Moore's or Spaulding's
representation in the future.0 8 That caveat was not enough, however,
to guarantee that her clients' rights would be preserved, as became
clear a few months later.''
As I describe more fully below in the analysis of the so-called
"compromise" settlement, LDF and ACLU attorneys squandered an
important opportunity at the December 1972 hearing on the ade-
quacy of plaintiffs' representation. They blundered by acquiescing to
Spaulding's appearance in the case and by failing to impress upon the
court the vast differences between their remedial approaches and
those of the King-led faction represented by Spaulding. By March, a
King-brokered settlement agreement with the school board had
gained momentum, particularly among the white, antibusing public
and in the white-owned media. By this time, LDF attorneys, who con-
107 See id. at 2-14 (recording the discussion between the judges and Moore and
Spaulding).
108 Interview with Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, supra note 91; see also Record of
Dec. 28, 1972, supra note 95, at 5-14 ("I could not waive that right [to object to repre-
sentation by Moore, Spaulding, and Rindskopf] on behalf of the parties I represent.").
109 See infta text accompanying notes 119-25 (discussing Hames's later objection to
Spaulding's representation and judge Smith's rejection of her arguments).
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tinued to insist on a remedy consistent with Swann, were being pub-
licly excoriated by Lonnie King as "damn Yankees" who had invaded
Atlanta like Sherman, this time by running roughshod over the priori-
ties of Atlanta's black community. l5 Had LDF and Hames pushed
ahead with their objections in December, when Judges Smith and
Henderson were amenable to the argument that King and Spaulding's
entry into the case was improper, it is likely that the settlement never
would have been considered by the court, or if considered, their pro-
tests would have been more credible. Having made the calculated de-
cision not to challenge King and Spaulding's entry into the case, the
LDF attorneys and Hames later would be in the position of trying to
stop a runaway train: a "compromise" settlement that had been under
consideration for months.
The "compromise" settlement offered much for African American
administrators but less for African American students. Although
Brown and its progeny, including Swann, were concerned primarily
with dismantling the system of separate but equal schools for children,
the Atlanta settlement agreement addressed the needs of school ad-
ministrators first and foremost. In fact, .the first three pages of the
twenty-five-page document consisted of a list of thirty-seven adminis-
trative positions, seventeen newly created." Pursuant to the settle-
ment agreement, twenty-five of these positions, including sixteen of
the new jobs, were to be filled by blacks. The deal stipulated that the
superintendent of the school system and the assistant superintendents
for community affairs and personnel were to be African American,
while the associate superintendent for administration and the assistant
superintendent for plant planning were to be white. Three of the
area superintendents were to be black, and two were to be white. In
addition, blacks were to occupy the new positions of food service co-
ordinator, coordinator of vocational personnel, and deputy director
of educational broadcasting, while whites were to have three of the
five assistant area superintendent positions and the coordinator of ma-
jority-to-minority transfers position. Still, the plan stipulated that its
configuration of administrative positions was to be maintained for
only three years; thereafter it was not binding. Furthermore, the
110 SeeJunie Brown, Clipping, ATLANTAJ.-CONST., § A (n.d.) (on file with NAACP
Papers, part IV, box 682) ("We don't appreciate a New York yankee coming down here
and telling us how to run our school case .... ).
III Plan of Proposed Settlement as Devised and Agreed upon Between Plaintiffs
and Defendants at 4-6, Calhoun (No. 6298) (on file with NARA, case file, box 55A,
folder 5) [hereinafter Plan of Proposed Settlement].
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plan's commitment to nondiscrimination and racial balance regard-
ing staff (defined as teachers and principals) was unclear. It included
many provisions that would exempt officials from complying with
Fifth Circuit precedent requiring that the ratio of black to white
teachers in a school reflect that of the overall student population in
the school system.'
2
While the settlement proposal could not have been more explicit
in establishing a racial balance system for administrative positions, the
deal makers eschewed the principles espoused in Swann regarding
pupil desegregation. The proposal did not take advantage of the re-
medial tools approved by the Swann Court to desegregate pupils, such
as assigning and transporting students to schools not contiguous to
their neighborhoods in order to make the schools more racially bal-
anced. Instead, the proposal seemed designed to minimize rather
than maximize interracial contact among students. Professor Michael
Stolee, an expert retained by the plaintiffs, argued that the agreement
minimized pupil desegregation to such an extent that eighty-three of
the city's 153 schools, with 59,064 students (a majority of the system's
pupils), were left ninety percent or more black." ' That is, they were
not desegregated at all under the Fifth Circuit's indulgent standards,
pursuant to which a school with an eighty-nine percent black popula-
tion was considered desegregated. Among the eighty-three schools
that were to remain segregated, forty-five schools, containing 32,817
students, had one hundred percent black enrollment. Only 814 white
students and 1951 African American students were to be bused under
the plan. Moreover, to the extent that any busing occurred at all, it
would be the children of working-class and poor black families (and a
few whites) who would bear the brunt of the transportation burdens.
Middle- and upper-income black neighborhoods were unaffected by
busing, while children from poor communities, such as northwest At-
lanta's Archer School community, were subject to busing under the
plan. At the same time as it eschewed racial balance mandates for pu-
pils, the plan endorsed the voluntary student transfer program, even
though the Supreme Court had rejected such freedom-of-choice pro-
grams as effective remedies for dejure segregation in its 1968 decision
112 Id. at 3-9; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text (referencing Fifth Cir-
cuit precedent on the issue).
P Affidavit of MichaelJ. Stolee at ]-15, Calhoun (No. 6298) (on file with NARA,
case file, box 55A, folder 3) [hereinafter Stolee Affidavit].
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Green v. County School Board,' 4 and again in 1969 in Alexander v. Holmes
County Board of Education. 1
5
D. Civil Rights Lawyers and Their Client-Communities React to the Settlement
1. An Unconstitutional Settlement?
The compromise negotiated by Lonnie King was a plan contain-
ing provisions that the Fifth Circuit twice had rejected as constitution-
ally inadequate in the previous year. LDF attorneys Moore and Rind-
skopf refused to sign the agreement and, along with Margie Hames,
filed objections to the settlement in the weeks after February 23 when
the plan was submitted to the district court. In a March 8 filing, the
LDF attorneys repudiated their position at the December hearing,
where they had downplayed their disagreements with Spaulding and
King. Moore and Rindskopf now importuned the court to reject the
settlement because Spaulding and King's objectives were incompatible
with theirs. They argued that the pair's negotiation of the settlement
and their attempt to have it approved by the court (notwithstanding
the fact that many members of the class did not agree with it) violated
the Due Process Clause. The right of African American students to
attend a desegregated school could not be waived by class representa-
tives, Moore and Rindskopf argued, particularly when their attorneys
objected to the waiver. '
Regarding the substance of the plan, Moore and Rindskopf ar-
gued that the pupil assignment scheme endorsed by Spaulding and
King violated the Equal Protection Clause because it left Atlanta's seg-
regated school system substantially intact. Moreover, while claiming
that extensive school transportation of both African American and
114 391 U.S. 430, 44142 (1968).
115 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam); see Plan of Proposed Settlement, supra
note 111, at 9-15 (describing the majority-to-minority pupil-transfer plan whereby stu-
dents could request transfers to schools of their choice if the transfers would further
the desegregation of the school system); Stolee Affidavit, supra note 113, at 6 (project-
ing that, even if all the 705 black children expected to elect the majority-to-minority
transfer plan did so, the plan would only provide a desegregated education for 1.2% of
the black children in the eighty-three schools); see also RESEARCH ATLANTA, ANALYSIS
OF ATLANTA COMPROMISE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PLAN 5 (1973) (on file with
NAACP Papers, part V, box 683) (analyzing how the compromise plan would expand
the scope of the majority-to-minority program).
116 Cf. Plan of Proposed Settlement, supra note 111, at 9-25 (summarizing the ma-
jority-to-minority pupil-transfer plan proposed as part of the settlement, under which
students could voluntarily choose reassignment to a desegregated school).
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white students, about 23,000 students total, was needed to achieve a
school system considered desegregated under the relevant legal stan-
dard, Moore and Rindskopf also argued that the plan violated the
Equal Protection Clause because the principal inconvenience of trans-
fers and transportation fell upon poor blacks and, to a lesser extent,
low-income white students. The LDF attorneys further objected that
the plan to desegregate the staff did not fully comply with Fifth Circuit
precedent. They claimed its provisions regarding administrative posi-
tions were inadequate because the three-year duration of the com-
mitment to increased black participation in the school administration
was too short and, in any event, the plan would not result in meaning-
ful black participation in the administration of the school system.
Margie Hames endorsed LDF's objections and later would make sev-
eral more of her own."7
At a hearing on March 8, the same day that LDF filed its written
objections to the settlement, Moore and Rindskopf-together with
Haries and other interested parties-articulated to the district court
their concerns about the King-endorsed plan and Spaulding's and
King's roles as representatives of the plaintiffs. Moore and Rindskopf
repudiated the position that LDF had taken before the very same
judges on December 28; now that their attempts to negotiate with
Spaulding and King had ended in failure, the two LDF attorneys,
along with Hames, objected to various aspects of the plan, calling
them inconsistent with the constitutional requirements set forth in
Singleton and Swann.
The judges were disturbed by the attorneys' about-face. In re-
sponse to Moore's request for an evidentiary hearing regarding the
"adequacy of representation of counsel who negotiated" the settle-
117 See Objection to "Plan of Proposed Settlement" Filed Herein and Motion for
Order in Accordance with Mandate of Court of Appeals at 1-11, Calhoun (No. 6298)
(on file with NARA, case file, box 55A, folder 4) (laying out arguments regarding why
the proposed settlement should not be approved by the court); Supplemental Objec-
tions to Compromise Settlement, Mar. 29, 1973 at 1-4, Calhoun (No. 6298) (on file with
NARA, case file, box 55A, folder 1) [hereinafter Supplemental Objections] (adding
two more objections to the proposed settlement); see also Stolee Affidavit, supra note
113, at 1-15 (discussing the proposed settlement and its flaws with respect to the deseg-
regation policy). For additional contemporary sources engaging the debate over the
benefits and drawbacks of the various plans, see Junie Brown, OK by Court Doubted for
School Plan Here: Integration Measure Includes Little Basing, ATLANTAJ., Nov. 17, 1972, at
1A;Junie Brown, School Board, NAACP Agree on Compromise, ATLANTAJ., Nov. 21, 1972,
at IA; Donna Lorenz, Desegregation Expert Gripes About City Compromise Plan, Clipping
(n.d.) (on file with NAACP Papers, part V, box 684); Susanna McBee, Atlanta Blacks
Trade Busing for Power, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1973, at A2; Reginald Stuart, Atlanta Splits
on School Plan, RACE REL. REP., Feb. 19, 1973, at 5, 6-7.
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ment, Judge Henderson expressed that "it is getting extremely frus-
trating... that we seem to get these things resolved and we come back
today and nobody is in agreement about anything, not even who rep-
resents the plaintiffs in the case.' 8 Similarly, when Hames objected
to the plan on the grounds that it had "been written behind closed
doors," a circumstance that she said caused it to have an "odor of sus-
picion,""' Judge Smith reprimanded her for making an issue of
Spaulding's representation when she had failed to object to it not
three months earlier.
1 20
Undaunted, Hames turned the court's focus from her earlier mis-
step to the traditional requirements in cases of the type before the
court; she reminded the court that it was customary to give affected
parties notice and a hearing prior to approving a settlement of a class
action. l In response to Hames's suggestion, the court took a position
that seemed contradictory but that, in fact, revealed the limited extent
to which it was willing to consider the possibility that some class mem-
bers might have interests distinct from those that Spaulding offered to
the court. Judge Smith agreed that the court might need to "poll the
class to help us form an opinion about whether it is to the best interest
of the class to accept the settlement,' '2 2 but at the same time ques-
tioned whether the class members had a "legal right to voice objec-
tions. ' ' 123 Moreover, the judge rejected Hames's argument that prece-
dent concerning stockholders' derivative class actions, which
stipulated that plaintiffs are entitled to notice and a hearing on the
merits of a settlement prior to its approval by a court, were applicable
in civil rights actions.2 4 He concluded that such precedent was inap-
plicable because the stockholder actions involved "money," never
mind Hames's argument that the constitutional rights involved in Cal-
houn were "greater than money.
' ' 
12,
Whereas Hames argued forcefully and passionately to preserve her
clients' rights, Moore employed a more restrained and technical ap-
proach throughout the hearing. His approach turned on convincing
118 Record of Mar. 8, 1973 at 32-33, Calhoun (No. 6298) (on file with NAACP Pa-
pers, box 685).
119 Id. at 16.
120 Id. at 15-16.
121 Id. at 26.
M22 Id. at 27.
123 Id. at 28.
124 Id. at 28-29.
125 Id. at 28; Interview with Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, supra note 91.
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the court through written materials, including briefs and affidavits
from experts, that the settlement plan was unconstitutional. Moore
did not attempt to buttress or match Hames's oratory. For instance,
in the face of Judge Smith's suggestion that only those with money at
stake were entitled to a hearing prior to a court's approval of a settle-
ment, Moore remained silent, except for his promise to cite authority
on the issue in his next legal brief.2 6 Such coyness seems a peculiar
strategic choice for Moore, a lawyer who by all accounts was a great
talent and unafraid to hurl rhetorical flourishes at an opponent. After
all, Moore had harshly criticized Spaulding and King outside of court
in the days and weeks leading up to the hearing.127
2. The ACLU Puts a Poor and Human Face on the Legal Proceedings
Hames sought to put a human face on the proceedings-to ex-
plain the settlement's inadequacy in human, rather than strictly legal,
terms. To achieve this objective, Hames brought some of her clients
to court and encouraged them to speak on their own behalf. The
spokesperson for the group of Armour plaintiffs was Ethel Mae
Mathews, a leader of the local chapter of the National Welfare Rights
Organization, a grassroots advocacy group for recipients of public as-
sistance. Mathews, a welfare recipient living in public housing, had
come to the conclusion that poor people had 'just as many rights as
,,128the rich person. Moreover, because she had learned from her ex-
periences in the welfare system that abusive caseworkers were just as
likely to be African American as white, Mathews was not reluctant to
point out the transgressions of persons with authority, even if doing so
breached racial solidarity. Mathews strode to the podium and offered
her frank opinions after Judges Smith and Henderson asked whether
any onlookers had anything to add, and, given her background, this
was not surprising.
Unintimidated by her surroundings in the federal district court
and undeterred by the way her nonstandard English and lowly status
were sure to be viewed by the professionals and civil servants occupy-
ing the court room, Mathews unflinchingly proclaimed that the set-
126 See Record of Mar. 8, 1973, supra note 118, at 66 (capturing Moore's promise to
submit appropriate authorities on the question of whether an evidentiary hearing
would be necessary if the court were to adopt the proposed settlement).
127 Interview with Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, supra note 91; see also supra notes 98-
99 and accompanying text (recounting Moore's appellation of the settlement negotia-
tors as "Uncle Toms" engaged in a "slave auction").
128 Interview with Ethel Mae Mathews in Atlanta, Ga. (July 6, 2000).
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tlement was illegitimate. Her primary point was that the settlement
was the product of a corrupt process. The process was unjust,
Mathews said, because people like the Armour plaintiffs, "black peo-
ples and poor peoples," as she described them, had been excluded
from the negotiating sessions, "from wheeling and dealing.''2 9 Ac-
cording to Mathews, the interests of these "black peoples and poor
peoples" had been overlooked by leaders purporting to represent At-
lanta's black community, despite the fact that the black poor had suf-
fered most under the unequal system of education. She said:
I am not pleased with the settlement because we black and poor have
been sold out for too long, just keep being sold out by our own peoples;
so I would like for the Court to [reconsider] and let us poor people be
in on the decision as black and poor peoples, because we are the ones
can tell, we are the ones that live it, we are the ones that our children go
to the ghetto schools.
1
30
Mathews went on to express support for a remedy that included bus-
ing, but she argued that the busing should be a "two-way street" so
that wealthy white children, as well as poor black children, would bear
the transportation burden.'
Similarly, Edward Moody, a Calhoun plaintiff, forcefully made the
point that he saw "buses running everyday," taking students to and
from school, and that "nobody questions that busing," yet people were
up in arms about the possibility that a desegregation plan would man-
date a significant amount of busing. Joseph Boone, an African
American minister who had protested outside of the closed-door set-
tlement negotiations in November of 1972, also demanded "recipro-
cal" busing and voiced support for the metropolitan relief sought in
the Armour suit."' Another minister, Reverend Bernard Lee, chief of
staff of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, adopted a
tone like Mathews's in decrying the settlement. He saw deliberate
malfeasance: the plan was "designed to set back" race relations in At-
lanta "for the next one hundred years," he said, and was yet another
attempt to "block school desegregation" in the city, though it was
sorely needed, especially for working-class and poor blacks. 34
129 Record of Mar. 8, 1973, supra note 118, at 35-36.
13o Id.; see also Interview with Ethel Mae Mathews, supra note 128; Interview with
Reverend Austin Thomas Ford in Atlanta, Ga. (July 5, 2000).
131 Record of Mar. 8, 1973, supra note 118, at 35-36.
1.2 Id. at 42.
133 Id. at 61.
134 Id. at 61-63.
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Remarks by two white defendants, school board members who
opposed the settlement, lent support to such sentiments. Mrs. Leroy
Woodward buttressed the contention that those who conceived of the
plan played favorites when she remarked that the student assignment
and transportation plan "was determined by excluding those schools
who brought tremendous pressure on the school board and the plain-
tiffs," resulting in "discrimination toward certain schools.' ' 35 "I am dis-
turbed and concerned that our schools are being used to satisfy per-
sonal and political gains," Woodward added. 3 6 Likewise, Howard
Klein, a school board member, objected to the plan because it was un-
fair to "poor black" schools.
In addition to these outspoken dissenters, the court heard from
two African American laypersons who expressed support for the set-
tlement plan at the March 8 hearing. One of them, Carolyn Crowder,
was president-elect of the Fulton High School Parent Teacher Associa-
tion; she clearly expressed her willingness to defer to the judgment of
black leaders such as King. To distinguish herself from Mathews
and others, Crowder declared, "I'm not one of these people that feel I
have to be included [in the negotiations] .,,39 Her loyalty was to Ful-
ton High, which she wanted to see improved so that black children
would not need to be bused to wealthy white neighborhoods to obtain
a quality education. 40 Similarly, the other unambiguous supporter of
the settlement, Edith Hammond, identified herself as being "from"
(and, implicitly, representing) North Fulton High School, although
she did not make clear whether she was attending the hearing in an
official capacity.' 4' The words that Hammond used to express her
support for the settlement echoed the concerns of many elites about
Atlanta's national reputation. By embracing the settlement, she said,
the black and white people of Atlanta accepted a "unique opportu-
nity" to "show the country how we can work together" to achieve a
"compromise" that had been negotiated in "good faith.' 42
135 Id. at 49.
13'6 Id. at 50-51.
137 Id. at 51.
138 See id. at 37 ("I do feel that the two parties worked very diligently and very hard
and some long, honest hours in trying to come up with a plan that was suitable to most
of us.").
139 Id. at 37.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 45.
142 Id.
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On March 29, the court convened another hearing, but this one
was held for the precise purpose of considering objections to the pro-
posed settlement plan by members of the plaintiff class.14 Whereas
the March 8 hearing had not been officially announced, a notice
printed in local newspapers two weeks prior to the March 29 hearing
alerted members of the class, at least those likely to read a daily, of
their opportunity to appear and state their objections to the settle-
ment. 44 Thirty-six individuals testified before the court on March
29.145
Several speakers who objected to the settlement expressed strong
support for the metropolitan remedy sought in the Armour suit. Many
of them dismissed the notion advanced by Lonnie King and the elite
backers of the proposed settlement that black parents were opposed
to busing. For instance, Mamie Dixon asserted that the issue of how
far students had to travel to school had been overblown; she stated
unequivocally that "the Metro suit is the answer" to the problem of
black schools' inadequacy. 1 Ethel Mae Mathews, who had spoken so
eloquently at the March 8 hearing, again stated her opinion that the
King-backed settlement was unjust because it would not enhance the
ability of most children in the school system to receive a better educa-
tion. Flatly stating that the settlement amounted to "our child[ren]
be [ing] pawned for a few greenbacks," 147 Mathews insisted that African
American parents were not opposed to busing across district lines if
doing so allowed their children to attend better schools. 148 Similarly,
Emma Armour, the named plaintiff in Armour, remarked in objecting
to the settlement that her children "don't mind bussing" if they could
"get the same equal rights as the white children do."4 9 Stanley Wise
expressed support for a cross-district remedy because he viewed it as
the only way to ensure that the resources routinely available in the
white schools were made available to blacks.'5 Others who objected to
the settlement echoed the sentiments of Armour plaintiffs who be-
lieved that the poor gained few, if any, benefits from the settlement.
143 Record of Mar. 29, 1973 at 4, Calhoun (No. 6298) (on file with NAACP Papers,
box 685).
144 See id. (observing that requisite notice had been given to the plaintiff class).
145 See id. at 2-3 (listing the appearances of the plaintiffs).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 28.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 31.
150 Id. at 56-58.
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Though Walker Moore did not articulate direct support for the met-
ropolitan remedy favored by the Armour plaintiffs, he objected to the
King plan on the ground that only the "poor black people" and the
"poor white people" would be "moved about and juggled about" un-
der the proposed settlement. 5'
3. The Settlement's Supporters Speak
Even though the hearing was conceived as a forum for plaintiffs
who objected to the plan to articulate their points of view, several Afri-
can Americans testified in favor of the settlement on March 29. Many
of those in this camp were obviously dispatched to undercut the im-
pact of those opposing the King plan. In fact, many of these speakers
were not even plaintiffs and therefore should not have been heard by
the court. For example, Charles Hart identified himself as a member
of the Community Relations Commission of the City of Atlanta and
read a resolution that he said was passed by its African American and
white members on February 27. The resolution admitted the mem-
bers' displeasure with Calhoun and those responsible for its filing:
The Community Relations Commission wishes to express its appreciation
of the Atlanta Board of Education, the Atlanta Chapter of the NAACP
and the Biracial Committee for the agreement reached in settlement of
the court case which has hung over our schools and our city like a
threatening cloud for fifteen years. We are grateful that this settlement
has come out of mutual concern to the citizens of Atlanta themselves
and has not been imposed by an outside authority or by the Court.1
The reference to an "outside authority" was a thinly veiled effort to
equate LDF with carpetbaggers who had disrupted Atlanta's peace
and tranquility.
The voice of the generation of black elites who had come to
power in Atlanta after World War II was heard through the personage
ofJohn H. Calhoun, the former NAACP president, who was allowed to
testify in favor of the compromise, though there was no evidence that
he had children in the school system. 153 The court also allowed ex-
tended family of children in the school system, who likewise were not
plaintiffs, to testify. Ruby L. Edwards claimed authority to speak be-
cause she was a grandmother of children in the school system. Ed-
wards's opinion that the settlement should be adopted was predicated
151 Id. at 44.
152 Id. at 20.
153 Id. at 70-71.
2003] 19 53
1954 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA lAW RVJEW [Vol. 151:1913
on her family's employment interests and her conviction that black
teachers were as good as white ones: Edwards had two daughters
teaching in the Atlanta schools, she proclaimed, and she was sure that
"they arejust as competent as white teachers.' 54
A few of the African Americans who spoke in favor of the settle-
ment were parents of children attending Atlanta's public schools.
Doris Arnold was one such parent, as well as president of the PTA of
L.J. Price High School. Her statement revealed her allegiance to that
historically black institution as well as her view that anyone who op-
posed the settlement had fallen under the influence of outsiders.
Arnold asked the court to adopt the plan supported by the local
NAACP rather than listen to "national organizations" that were "trying
to come to our city, trying to disrupt" local decision makers. 15 1 In this
way, Arnold's testimony tracked the rhetoric of the Community Rela-
tions Commission's February 27 resolution.'56
There were some notable exceptions to the insider-versus-outsider
mentality, however. Gladys Stroub was one of two mothers who made
direct appeals to the court in favor of the settlement without refer-
ence to LDF's status as an outsider.5 7 Her appeal was based on her
circumstances as a poor mother of nine children and resident of the
Perry Homes housing project.5 Stroub supported the settlement be-
cause she did not want her children to be bused across town-out of
her reach. "I wouldn't feel right," she explained.'
5 9
4. Opportunities Lost and Found
Despite the diversity of opinions on the issues addressed, the
March 29 hearing was a failure on a number of fronts. First, consider-
ing the thousands of individuals whose rights were implicated by the
proposed settlement of Calhoun, relatively few people seized the op-
portunity to express an opinion about the plan. And yet, such a low
rate of participation was almost a foregone conclusion. Decades of
elite control, together with an ineffective student movement and civil
rights lawyers who had failed to engage their client base, had left most
154 Id. at 26.
155 Id. at 21.
1 See supra text accompanying note 152 (reproducing the Community Relations
Commission's resolution, which praised local efforts at improving education for all stu-
dents in Atlanta).
1,7 Record of Mar. 29, 1973, supra note 143, at 48-49.
118 Id. at 48.
159 Id.
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black Atlantans, especially the working class and poor, ignorant of the
mechanisms for exercising influence on public policy and disinclined
to involve themselves in such matters.160
Nevertheless, the ACLU-affiliated attorney, Margie Hames, was
able to turn out some of her clients. Armour plaintiffs like Ethel Mae
Mathews and Mamie Dixon challenged the propriety of the settlement• 161
in an informed, thoughtful, and passionate manner.
By contrast, judging from the paucity of Calhoun plaintiffs at the
March 29 hearing, it appears that LDF's Moore had made little effort
to involve class members in the process. Nor was any effort apparently
made to explain to those plaintiffs who did appear that their com-
ments should state a point of view on the propriety of the settle-
ment-that this was their chance to influence the judges in whose
hands their children's futures lay.
The hearing demonstrated in a striking manner the consequences
of LDF's disengagement from the client community it represented.
As Mary Sanford, a public housing tenant, explained at the hearing,
she and other parents needed an organization that would represent
parents of school-aged children so that they would know their rights
and know how to advocate for equal education.162 As the attorneys of
record for the plaintiffs for over fifteen years, LDF presumably should
have been that organization.
E. An Impartial Court Responds to the Opposition?
The LDF attorneys were not alone to blame for the chaos in court
on March 29. The hearing also demonstrated the court's indulgence
of the settlement's backers. That so many supporters of the settle-
ment plan at the hearing were not even plaintiffs raises serious ques-
tions about whether their testimony had been arranged by the settle-
ment's negotiators. The court's failure to adhere to its stated rule of
allowing only plaintiffs to speak revealed a lack of control over the
proceeding-a situation that fundamentally undermined the plain-
tiffs* due process rights. Furthermore, the judges did not fulfill their
duty to elicit and consider the plaintiffs' views regarding the proposed
settlement. For instance, the judges did not ask the speakers ques-
tions that might have clarified the speakers' remedial preferences-a
160 See Brown-Nagin, supra note 43, at ch. 2 (discussing biracial negotiation strategy
for achieving civil rights); id. at ch. 3 (discussing the failure of the student movement).
161 See supra Part II.D.2 (recounting the Armour plaintiffs' testimony).
162 Record of Mar. 29, 1973, supra note 143, at 58-60.
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critical failure in light of the number of speakers who omitted any
recommendation regarding approval of the settlement. 63 Moreover,
the judges scheduled the hearing for ten o'clock in the morning, 164 a
time when few working-class people could arrange to attend. As one
speaker, Evelyn Parham, explained to the court:
I feel like a lot of black people work when you all meet and they can't get
off to come, and maybe this is a lot of the problem of what's going on
in[] the schools. They can't push as a white person can leave their job,
they can't push for what they need in the school; so they sit back and
have to go along with the decision that the people make across the
boards and all.
165
Parham's comments revealed the decision makers' failure to compre-
hend basic facts about the life circumstances of the working poor, as
well as the powerlessness to influence the legal process that those
most affected by the settlement felt.
The court reaffirmed its limited patience with those who at-
tempted to thwart the settlement plan by rejecting efforts to challenge
the settlement on constitutional grounds. Attorneys for LDF, the
ACLU, and CORE had filed motions pointing out various ways in
which the deal brokered by King and Spaulding was unlawful."" One
by one, the district court rejected them, and it did so without granting
the attorneys a chance to argue their points in court. 167 Howard
Moore's decision to challenge the settlement solely through written
objections proved a miscalculation, as the court rejected LDF's sup-
plemental objections on the same day that they were filed and also
spurned Moore's plea to be heard on the matter." " Over Moore's
protests, the judges ruled that a full hearing on LDF's contention that
the settlement was unconstitutional would be contingent on its rejec-
tion of that very plan. "If we reject the proposed settlement, there will
be further hearings; if we do not, this will be the last hearing," Judge
Smith retorted to Moore's suggestion that the court was denying the
plaintiffs due process by refusing to allow him to argue his objec-
l6; See Record of Mar. 29, 1973, supra note 143 (showing a lack of follow-up ques-
tions by the judges after the speakers' testimony).
164 Notice of Hearing, Mar. 12, 1973 at 1-3, Calhoun (No. 6298) (on file with
NAACP Papers, part V, box 682).
165 Record of Mar. 29, 1973, supra note 143, at 54-55.
166 Id. at 4-5.
17 hi. at 4-16.
168 Id. at 14-16.
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tions.' 69 The court's rationale for its decision was circular and implied
its predisposition to approve the deal.
Such circularity and predisposition were also evident in the
court's response to the efforts of CORE and the national NAACP to
become involved in the case.170 The NAACP's motion to intervene was
based on general counsel Nathaniel Jones's argument that neither the
LDF attorneys nor Spaulding was adequately representing the inter-
ests of the class members.17' According to Jones's motion, Spaulding
was attempting to gain approval for a settlement that was inconsistent
with the law mandating meaningful pupil desegregation. 172 "We have
more parties and lawyers than we can handle now," Judge Smith ex-
plained in rejecting Jones's claims that the national NAACP had a
special interest in the case;173 he continued by saying, "there are about
75,000 plaintiffs in the case, and we cannot have separate lawyers for
every one of them.' 74 The court went further, saying that no more
hearings or discovery were needed because "[w] e have fifteen years of
evidence in the case."7 5 The court's quips skirted Jones's point that
the settlement had raised an entirely different issue than had ever
been presented in the case before and thus demanded new evidence.
Judge Smith gave similarly pat answers to Charles Conley, CORE's
attorney, who at a February press conference had denounced Lonnie
King for "trading off quality education for a few big jobs for a few big
Negroes." 7 6 Conley objected to the settlement on the grounds that
poor class members in northwest Atlanta's Archer school community
would rather remain in their neighborhood schools than bear the
brunt of busing, as required of them under the deal King had
brokered, while schools such as Douglass, Harper, and Washington,
located in "middle and upper income black communities," went unaf-
fected.177 "It appears quite clearly that the plan discriminates in favor
of the more well-to-do sections," Conley argued at the March 8 hear-
169 Id. at 16.
170 See id. at 4-14 (denying the motions of CORE and the NAACP to intervene).
171 i. at5.
172 Id.
1 ld. at 6.
174 Id. at 12.
175 Id. at 10.
176 Jim Stewart, CORE Hits NAACP with Counter Bus Suit, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 23,
1973, § A.
177 Petition of the Congress of Racial Inequality, Inc. at 2, Calhoun (No. 6298) (on
file with NARA, case file, part V, box 682).
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ing.78 On March 29 the court denied for a second time Conley's mo-
tion to enter the case. 7 ' "[O]ne thing this case doesn't need is a few
more lawyers," had been Judge Smith's reply to Conley on March 8,180
and he maintained this stance three weeks later when Nathaniel Jones
moved for the NAACP to intervene.' This was the judge's position,
notwithstanding the fact that Conley, like Hames, had tried mightily
to impress upon the court that the settlement plan was particularly
unfair, inadequate, and unconstitutional with respect to poor and
working-class plaintiffs-the most educationally needy and vulnerable
children."'
Hames's objections to the settlement on behalf of the Armour
plaintiffs-twenty-six impoverished parents with children in the school
system who were said to represent 4000 other poor parents-were not
as easily dismissed as the other challenges. 18' In addition to claiming
that the settlement was unconstitutional in its substance and preju-
diced her clients' ability to attain metropolitan relief, Hames con-
tended that the plan should be rejected because the process that pro-
duced it was tainted.8 4  Hames alleged that Lonnie King, a chief
negotiator of the plan, had a conflict of interest because of his finan-
178 Record of Mar. 8, 1973, supranote 118, at 22.
179 Record of Mar. 29, 1973, supra note 143, at 4-5.
180 Record of Mar. 8,1973, supra note 118, at 20.
181 Record of Mar. 29, 1973, supra note 143, at 11-12.
182 Id. at 4-16; see Supplemental Objections, supra note 117, at 1-4 (objecting to the
plan because of the possibility that some schools would not receive equal attention in
the compromise); Stolee Affidavit, supra note 113, at 1-15 (testifying that some schools
would be completely omitted from the desegregation process); Motion of the NAACP
to Intervene as Plaintiffs at 1-4, Calhoun (No. 6298) (on file with NAACP Papers, box
683) (stating the NAACP's intent to intervene on behalf of all black plaintiffs in the
class); Record of Mar. 8, 1973, supra note 118, at 18-25 (containing CORE attorney
Conley's motions to intervene); Petition for Intervention as a Party Plaintiff, Feb. 21,
1973 at 1-4, Calhoun (No. 6298) (on file with NAACP Papers, box 682) (containing
CORE's motion to intervene on behalf of its clients); Stewart, supra note 176 (noting
CORE's accusation that the NAACP was "'trading off quality education for a few big
jobs for a few big Negroes"'). Although the court rejected Conley's request to become
formally involved in the case, the judges did give him the opportunity to file an amicus
brief on behalf of CORE. See Record of Mar. 8, 1973m supra note 118, at 3 (transcrib-
ing.judge Smith's remark to Conley that "while we denied you intervention as a matter
of right .... we would be glad to hear from you as a matter of amicus").
F., See Record of Mar. 29, 1973, supra note 143, at 7 (noting Hames's objection to
the Armour settlement); see also Supplemental Objections, supra note 117, at 1-4 (ex-
plaining that the Armour plaintiff class objected to the settlement because it was not
comprehensive); Stolee Affidavit, supra note 113, at 1-15 (arguing against the plan be-
cause it would leave many schools still segregated).
184 Record of Mar. 8, 1973, supra note 118, at 15-18.
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cial relationship with William VanLandingham, vice president of the
Citizens and Southern Bank (C&S Bank), school board member, and
the school board's chief negotiator in the settlement talks with King.
This allegation was based on documentary evidence-namely, a
contract showing that Lonnie King, as general manager and project
director of the Onyx Corporation, an educational consulting service,
had received $198,857 from VanLandingham's bank. ' The sum was
paid in connection with a contract that King had been awarded to
provide assistance to the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW), an agency for which he previously had worked, regarding
local Head Start grantees. The transaction between King and C&S
Bank occurred in August 1972, around the same time that King began
negotiations with VanLandingham, Frank Smith, John Letson, and
Griffin Bell to settle Calhoun)8 6 Moreover, Benjamin Spaulding, the
attorney whom King had hired to replace LDF in the school desegre-
gation case, served as King's counsel for the negotiations with the
bank and had been a signatory to the contract. Spaulding also had at-
tamined a personal loan from C&S Bank during this period.
In light of this evidence, Hames argued that King, Spaulding,
VanLandingham, and the C&S Bank, among others, should be re-
quired to answer questions about their relationship and its impact on
the settlement negotiations. Specifically, Hames sought to raise ques-
tions about King's and Spaulding's abilities to serve as adequate repre-
sentatives of the plaintiffs considering their financial dealings with a
defendant. 188
The concern about a financial conflict of interest also pointed to a
different kind of question: What had caused Lonnie King's sudden
about-face regarding the propriety of pupil desegregation? In his po-
sition in HEW's Office of Civil Rights during the 1960s, King had
helped to draw up desegregation plans for several cities, and as late as
March of 1969 he had written of his support for "desegregated and
quality education" in a letter to national NAACP chairman Roy Wil-
kins describing the "bold and ambitious" program of the branch's
185 See Motion to Reconsider, supra note 79 (submitting evidence of the improper
relationships among the negotiators).
186 Id.
187 See id. at 1-9 (asking for reconsideration of the settlement because of alleged
collusion among some of the plaintiffs' attorneys).
188 Record of Mar. 29, 1973, supra note 143, at 7.
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"new leadership.'" Two years later, King's tune had changed radi-
cally: he had become leader of an effort to unseat LDF as counsel in
Calhoun and settle the case on terms that unequivocally deemphasized
pupil integration.
Years later, when King was asked to explain his actions, he stated
that the settlement agreement sprang from his desire to promote
black administrative control of the school system.' 0  King asserted
that, whereas a white administration would resist court orders that fur-
thered equality, black administrators would facilitate the implementa-
tion of court orders mandating educational equality.'9' Yet, the set-
tlement he negotiated changed the status quo in the school district so
little that his explanation for trading pupil integration for black ad-
ministrative control is hard to understand. After all, there were few, if
any, real policy changes to implement under the settlement.
Nevertheless, as I have explained in another article, one of the
troubling, unintended consequences of LDF's school desegregation
campaign was job loss by African American administrators and educa-
tors. Many black school principals and teachers were subjected to re-
taliatory and discriminatory discharges and demotions during the
transition to desegregated schools. '" There is no evidence, however,
that this general trend held in Atlanta or that it motivated the settle-
ment negotiations. Neither King nor any other black leader of the
compromise effort suggested that the settlement was predicated on a
desire to stem a pattern of discrimination against Atlanta's educators.
Moreover, whereas the Fifth Circuit precedent that was the predicate
for LDF's school plan mandated faculty desegregation throughout the
school district,1'9 the settlement agreement guaranteed jobs for just a
few African American administrators and did not protect the jobs of
black teachers.) 4 Hence, the settlement agreement achieved much
189 Letter from Lonnie C. King, Jr., President of the Atlanta Chapter of the
NAACP, to Roy Wilkins, Chairman, National NAACP (Mar. 19, 1969) (on file with
NAACP Papers, box C27, 1968-69 file).
190 McGrath, supra note 50, at 329-31, 334, 337-38.
191 Id. at 337.
192 Brown-Nagin, supra note 17, at 106.
See Singleton v.Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 419 F.2d 1211, 1218 (5th Cir.
1969) (per curiam) (requiring for the 1969-1970 school year that the ratio of black to
white staff members be substantially the same as that of black to white teachers); see
also Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 426 F.2d 1364, 1365 n.2 (5th Cir,
1970) (adopting the faculty-staff assignment ratio as the standard for a unitary system).
1 See supra text accompanying notes 67-69 (discussing the school board's pledge
to increase the ntmber of "key positions" available to blacks); see also supra text accom-
panying notes 111-12 (explaining the compromise settlement's creation of administra-
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less than the law required regarding faculty desegregation; at the same
time, the agreement spurned meaningful pupil integration, again
achieving much less than the law required. Under these circum-
stances, King's justification for the settlement's terms rings hollow.
Could greed have been the motive for the settlement? Did the
$198,857 loan represent a quid pro quo in which King and Spaulding
agreed to involve the local NAACP in the litigation and formulate a
settlement to the liking of VanLandingham and the school board in
exchange for the fee? This is impossible to know without an admis-
sion from King, Spaulding, or VanLandingham. Yet, even if there had
not been such a payoff, the very fact that King and Spaulding had en-
tered into a financial relationship with the primary defendant in the
school desegregation case (a case that they were now trying to settle as
plaintiffs' representatives) represented a clear conflict of interest.
Such a close relationship between putative adversaries certainly cre-
ated the impression that King and Spaulding had not been suitable
representatives for the plaintiffs. Since the deal between the two al-
legedly departed in such a fundamental way from constitutional
norms, it left the impression of impropriety especially strong.')!5
This arrangement was particularly suspicious because Hames's ob-
jections were not limited to King's and Spaulding's financial entan-
glements with VanLandingham. There was evidence of other ethical
improprieties that called into question King's fitness to serve as plain-
tiffs' representative. Hames brought to the court's attention an alle-
gation, first made in a newspaper article, that King had duped at least
two of the eight named plaintiffs whom he claimed to represent into
granting him power of attorney." ' These two plaintiffs, whose names
were withheld in the article, had informed a reporter that King and
another local NAACP officer, Jondelle Johnson, had "lied" to them by
telling them that "the NAACP needed a local attorney" because LDF
was from outside Atlanta."97 These two plaintiffs were further told that
tive positions for African Americans and its ambiguity with respect to racial balance for
teachers).
Under the canons of professional responsibility for lawyers, Spaulding was re-
quired to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of his clients and to
provide his clients with zealous representation. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILTY EC 5-1 (1969) (requiring independent judgment by attorneys); id. at
EC 7-1 (requiring zealous representation of clients). Similarly, in his capacity as puta-
tive power of attorney for a handful of plaintiffs, King was required to act in these cli-
ents' best interests.
196 Raffauf, supra note 79, at 4.
197 .
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"[i]f they would sign the papers [granting powers of attorney], this all
could be taken care of.'
'
If true, the plaintiffs' allegations were powerful. They suggested
that King and Johnson had misled the plaintiffs about the status of the
case. Contrary to King's and Johnson's alleged statements, the local
NAACP had no official role in the case. Thus, the claim that the
NAACP needed "a local attorney" was both untrue and a non sequitur.
Also left unsaid was that the alleged sudden need for "local" counsel
was the product of King's own ambitions and not of any shortcoming
in LDF's representation identified by the court or any party.9 The
suggestion that King had used false pretenses to obtain powers of at-
torney, which he then manipulated to depose LDF and install his own
hand-picked attorney, was shocking.0
If proven, Hames's explosive allegations surely should have pre-
vented approval of the settlement. In a meeting with Judge
Henderson concerning her request that King, Spaulding, VanLand-
ingham, and others submit to questions under oath about the nature
of their relationships and their influence on the settlement proposal,
Hames pointedly framed the issue of King's and Spaulding's fitness to
represent the plaintiffs: "I represent people who feel like there has
been a trade-off of rights of innercity [sic] black children for, whether
you call it blackjobs or whether you call it the personal gain or benefit
of Lonnie King, [or] both."20 '
Neither the court nor Spaulding, who appeared on behalf of
Lonnie King, expressed an interest in discussing the substance of
Hames's assertions. Instead, King and Spaulding relied on technicali-
ties to avoid answering Hames's allegations. Spaulding claimed that
because he was the attorney of record for the plaintiffs, Hames had no
legal standing to question his representation of the plaintiffs.0 2
Hames, in turn, stressed that her clients were members of the plaintiff
198 Id.
199 See id. (recounting the various ways Lonnie King profited by replacing LDF with
Spaulding).
200 See Supplemental Objections, supra note 117, at 3 (alleging that King and
Spaulding were subject to conflicts of interest and objecting to their representation of
the plaintiffs); Motion to Reconsider, supra note 79, at 1-9 (requesting reconsideration
of an order denying the right to take discovery depositions to investigate King's and
Spaulding's potential conflicts of interest arising from their connection with a bank
loan from VanLandingham's bank to King's Onyx Corporation).
201 Record of Mar. 26, 1973 at 13, Calhoun (No. 6298) (on file with NAACP Papers,
part V, box 685).
202 Id. at 4.
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class and had objections to Spaulding's participation in the case, a fact
203that Hames (as their attorney) had a duty to raise.
After a lengthy colloquy between Hames and Judge Henderson,
the court embraced Spaulding's perspective . 4 In doing so, the court
ignored the fact that the plaintiff class was split into two opposing fac-
tions, one of which had never consented to Spaulding's representa-
tion and presumably retained the right to object both to Spaulding's
participation in the case and to the substance of any settlement that
Spaulding and King had negotiated. Disregarding Hames's concerns
about conflicts of interest and collusion, Judge Henderson remarked
that he was "weary" of hearing claims that King and Spaulding were
improper representatives, given that Hames and LDF had not ob-
jected to their entry in the case in December 1972.205 "I am not going
to permit this case to be used as a vehicle for everybody to vent their
own personal feelings against everybody in the case, or their suspi-
cions about everything," Judge Henderson stated . With this, the
court ensured that there would be no truth seeking regarding
Hames's extraordinary allegations, notwithstanding legal precedent
dictating that courts thoroughly evaluate the circumstances surround-
207ing contested settlements and claims of inadequate representation.
Neither King nor Spaulding was ever asked to answer questions under
oath about his financial dealings with VanLandingham or the circum-
stances surrounding the powers of attorney they had obtained . 0
Nor would the court give any credit to objections to the settlement
raised by class members at the March 29 hearing. Judges Smith and
Henderson issued an opinion approving the settlementjust a few days
203 Id. at 4, 7-10.
204 Id. at 6-7, 11-16.
205 Id. at 12.
206 Id. at 11.
207 See Mass. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Forman, 469 F.2d 259, 261 (5th Cir. 1972) (per cu-
riam) (holding that under Florida law, a court must give parties a "full and fair oppor-
tunity to prove their version" of events where a dispute exists regarding the status of a
settlement); Cia Anon Venezolana de Navegacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir.
1967) (stating that where the authority of an attorney to negotiate a settlement is in
question, the agreement is binding unless the negotiations were not in good faith or
there is sound evidence that the attorney was not authorized by the client to settle); cf
Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that represen-
tation by a named plaintiff is inadequate where the representative does not eliminate
the possibility that some plaintiffs have interests antagonistic to other plaintiffs).
08 Record of Mar. 26, 1973, supra note 201, at 2-17; Motion to Reconsider, supra
note 79, at 1-3; Supplemental Objections, supra note 117, at 3-5.
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after the hearing. 209 On April 4, 1973, the district court brought an
end to Calhoun, which it termed "an ancient class action, ""'° conclud-
ing that the settlement negotiated by King and VanLandingham was
"fair, adequate and reasonable. 2 1' The court was unmoved by the
four organizations' claims that Spaulding's late entry into the case,
under dubious circumstances, invalidated the settlement. Citing
LDF's colossal strategic blunder-the failure at the December 1972
hearing to challenge Spaulding's entry into the case-the court re-
fused to recognize what it characterized as Moore and Rindskopfts be-
lated attempt to repudiate the settlement.1 LDF's "eleventh hour
maneuvering" was "inconsequential and without legal effect," the
court determined.212 The only reference to the plaintiffs who objected
to the settlement was confined to a footnote, where the court re-
marked that the plaintiffs' objections were "minimal" considering the
size of the class.2 4
Initially, it seemed that the Fifth Circuit might be inclined to
agree with the contention that the settlement was improper both as a
matter of equal protection and because of the procedurally inade-
quate manner in which the settlement had been put before the court.
In an August 21, 1973, opinion, the Fifth Circuit found that Judges
Smith and Henderson had given only perfunctory consideration to
the objections to the settlement and had improperly approved the set-
tlement over the objections of plaintiffs' attorneys.215 Whereas the dis-
trict court judges had all but ignored the controversy surrounding
King's and Spaulding's entries into the case and settlement negotia-
tions, the appeals court concluded that "no plan can be approved
as... valid" where such "widespread and genuine controversy" ex-
ists.2 16 Vacating the decision approving the settlement, the Fifth Cir-
cuit ordered the district court to allow the three groups of plaintiffs'
attorneys to present evidence on the merits of the proposed settle-
ment.2
17
209 Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249, 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
210 Id. at 1249.
211 Id. at 1252.
212 Id. at 1250.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 1251 n.5.
215 Calhoun v. Cook, 487 F.2d 680, 682-84 (5th Cir. 1973).
216 Id. at 682.
217 Id. at 684.
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But after remand and another round of hearings in the district
court, which resulted in yet another finding that the settlement was
proper and the school system unitary, the Fifth Circuit seemed worn
down. This, despite the fact that the district court had recognized in a
May 1974 order that the school board had not even complied with the
limited teacher and pupil desegregation goals contained in the
agreement.218 In an opinion issued on October 23, 1975, the court of
appeals bowed out of the fight over equal educational opportunity in
Atlanta. Even while acknowledging the lack of success in integrating
classrooms (ninety-two of 148 schools remained over ninety percent
black) , ' the court gave its approval for the district court to scuttle the
desegregation techniques identified in Swann .22" The court did so de-
spite conceding that "substantial precedent 2 2' supported LDF's con-
tention that a formerly dejure segregated school system could not be
considered unitary if it had never utilized Swann-type desegregation
techniques. Remarkably, the court of appeals decided that Atlanta's
public schools were exempt from Swann's desegregation dictates be-
cause of the racial identity of King and his supporters. It explained:
[F]or today and in Atlanta, the unique features of this district distinguish
[it from] every prior school case pronouncement. The district court
found that the black citizens who occupy the majority of the posts on the
school board, in two-thirds of the posts in the school administration and
staff and in over 60% of the faculty, as well as the numerous nonappeal-
ing black plaintiffs who agreed to and support the present plan attest the
district's lack of discrimination against black students as well as its free-
dom from the effects of past race-based practices.... In Atlanta, where
white students now comprise a small minority and black citizens can control
221school policy, administration and staffing, they no longer are.
In the appeals court's judgment, the common racial identity of
the plaintiffs and black school administrators trumped all other con-
siderations, apparently even constitutional ones. Having dispensed
with Swann and other constitutional concerns, the court dismissed as
218 See Calhoun v. Cook, No. 6298, at 9 (N.D. Ga. May 1, 1974) (on file with
NAACP Papers, box 55B, folder 6) ("[]n twelve instances, the goal level of desegrega-
tion, although approached, was not actually attained.").
219 Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717, 719 (5th Cir. 1975).
220 See id. at 720 (affirming the district court's approval of the King-sponsored
plan, calling it "free of racial discrimination"); see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971) (identifying busing and "remedial altering of at-
tendance zones" as appropriate desegregation techniques).
221 Calhoun, 522 F.2d at 719.
222 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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insignificant any objections to the settlement based on King's role in it
and its negative impact on working-class and poor African American
families.
213
The Fifth Circuit's ruling represented a triumph of narrow, racial-
ist thinking. Even as members of the plaintiff class repudiated the ac-
tions of a fellow African American, Lonnie King, the court assumed
that no legally cognizable discrimination could exist in the school sys-
tem because its superintendent and other administrators were African
American and not all African Americans had voiced concern about
ongoing discrimination. Whether born of indifference, cynicism, bias,
or mere weariness of the difficulties inherent in adjudicating a com-
plex civil rights class action, the Fifth Circuit's resolution of the case
reflected the assumption that a unity of interest flowed from racial
sameness. In relying on such reasoning, the court ignored the fact
that working-class and poor blacks had spent three years expressing
their opposition to a settlement that had been brokered by local black
leaders in the name of the barely operative Atlanta branch of the
NAACP.
III. LESSONS LEARNED
This Article's account of Brown's implementation in Atlanta has
independent value as a historical work. At the same time, the narra-
tive presented here speaks to broader, normative questions in consti-
tutional history and law. Most notably, this narrative holds implica-
tions for continuing debates about the meanings of Brown v. Board of
Education and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education and the
efficacy of public interest lawyers' efforts to achieve social change
through law. This Part suggests how this account bears on some of
these questions.
A. Brown in Atlanta: The Importance of Local Legal History
The overarching significance of the Atlanta narrative is its demon-
stration that shared racial identity did not imply a monolithic value set
223 See id. (emphasizing the voluntary nature of the participation in busing to dis-
miss the plaintiffs' concerns that "the movement involved is entirely by black stu-
dents"); see also Calhoun v. Cook, No. 6298 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 1973) (on file with
NAACP Papers, part V, box 683) (holding that alleged collusion between King and the
defendants was not pertinent and would not be considered further); Calhoun v. Cook,
No. 6298 (N.D. Ga. May 1, 1974) (noting that the only objections to the plan were filed
by the Armourv. Nix "Metro Group" and the intervenors associated with Deborah Birt).
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about questions of social policy during a crucial phase of civil rights
lawyers' efforts to implement Brown. During the mid-I 970s, when the
Supreme Court had finally made significant pupil integration possible
through its decision in Swann, African Americans no longer agreed on
the proper remedy for inequality in education. More particularly, this
Article has demonstrated the relevance of intraracial class conflict to
some African Americans' views on school desegregation. Class-related
tensions influenced some poor plaintiffs' perceptions concerning the
value of law for achieving social change and the value of the two types
of remedies for unequal education proposed by their legal representa-
tives: pupil desegregation, on the one hand, and administrative de-
segregation, on the other. Class-related preferences also influenced
those middle-class decision makers who favored a remedy that gave
African Americans administrative control over the school system and
who designed a desegregation plan under which the burden of busing
fell disproportionately on the shoulders of the black poor, while mid-
dle-class black students remained largely unaffected. In demonstrat-
ing the relevance of class to dynamics in Atlanta, the local legal history
told here reveals the limitations of scholarship that privileges race or
racism and doctrinal responses to them above all other factors in ana-
lyzing LDF's efforts to effectuate social change through the courts."'
The points of view, actions, and multifaceted identities of African
Americans in local communities matter as well.
By focusing on the lives and actions of local people, this Article
has sought to reorient the literature on LDF's litigation effort from its
focus on lawyers, judges, and white resistance to the client-
communities who were the putative beneficiaries of Brown. In so do-
ing, the history of the Atlanta desegregation cases corrects the ten-
dency to conflate Brown's vaunted place in American constitutional
history with the social meaning of Brown in African American com-
225munities. Stated differently, because it infuses the legal history of
Brown's implementation with the social history of the client-
224 The latest such effort, which asked several distinguished constitutional scholars
to rewrite the Brown opinion, is WHAT BROWN V. BOARD oF EUCA TION SHOULD HAVE
SAID (9 ack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
Brown routinely is celebrated by constitutional scholars as among the most im-
portant Supreme Court cases without reference to the case's actual impact on its in-
tended beneficiaries. For examples of such scholarship, see id. See also David J. Car-
row, The Supreme Court's Pursuit of Equality and Liberty and the Burdens of History, in
REDEFINING EQUALITY 205 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 1998) (describing
Brown, rather than Marbuiy v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), as the formative
Supreme Court case that demarcates our modern era).
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communities who were Brown's intended beneficiaries, the narrative
told here counters the notion that all of Brown's beneficiaries neces-
sarily experienced the new constitutional norm in a uniform and posi-
tive manner. At the same time, it discredits the idea that Brown's fail-
ure to improve educational opportunities for all African American
students can be attributed only to white opposition to, or middle-class
preference for, racially integrated schools" The Atlanta story dem-
onstrates that a constellation of factors influenced the course and effi-
cacy of school desegregation litigation, and that among these factors
was class-tinged disagreement among African Americans.
Perhaps the most important consequence of this Article's analysis
of the Atlanta litigation is to upset the conventional wisdom regarding
African American communities' perspectives on Brown. This truism,
accepted since the publication of Serving Two Masters and advanced in
numerous other scholarly works, is the suggestion that the African
American community-especially the working class-disagreed with
and did not benefit from the doctrine established in Brown. Under
this view, the notion that racially separate schools inherently are une-
qual is sentimental in theory and ineffective in practice: the prevail-
ing sentiment is that Brown's preoccupation with racial balance was
disconnected from the practical matters about which most blacks-
working-class and poor parents, in particular-were concerned, such
as the quality of school instruction, uneven allocation of resources,
227and inadequate parental influence over decision making. Even
scholars who vehemently support the view that Brown requires pupil
integration concede the "truth" of this position, proving its prevalence
226 See Bell, supra note 1, at 472-83 (arguing that, in predominantly black school
districts, the NAACP placed too much emphasis on desegregation rather than educa-
tion).
227 See, e.g., RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 3-8, 273-89 (1984) (addressing the impact of the Brown deci-
sion on five school districts and its failure to eradicate racial discrimination in educa-
tion); Bell, supra note 1, at 471 ("The espousal of educational improvement as the ap-
propriate goal of school desegregation efforts is out of phase with the current state of
the law."); Kevin Brown, African-American Immersion Schools: Paradoxes of Race and Public
Education, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY 415, 415-26 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic
eds., 2d ed. 2000) (discussing the lack of cultural influence in law and its importance
in education); Kevin Brown, Revisiting the Supreme Court's Opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education from a Multiculturalist Perspective, in BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: THE
CHALLENGE FOR TODAY'S SCHOOLS 44, 44 (Ellen Condliffe Lagemann & Lamar P.
Miller eds., 1996) (arguing that if "local school systems decide to engage in further ef-
forts to bring racially and ethnically diverse students together, it must not be on the
ideological basis of the Supreme Court's school desegregation opinions," and that the
'very kind of thinking about the issues of cultural diversity that Brown Iwas based upon
is [what] must be overcome in order for true multicultural education to occur").
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tion concede the "truth" of this position, proving its prevalence and
influence.2 8  Social science studies showing that African American
students in many communities choose integrated schools when they
22')are available routinely are overlooked by commentators.
The Atlanta narrative demonstrates the inaccuracy of this perspec-
tive in historical context. Brown was supported by many African
Americans, the number of which is difficult to ascertain because of the
social and legal dynamics that discouraged clients' active involvement
in civil rights lawyers' efforts to implement Brown. Moreover, the
segment of the Atlanta community that supported Brown was largely
working-class and poor; it was not middle-class blacks who pursued in-
tegration because of a putative inferiority complex or allegiance to
LDF's white benefactors. Thus, the correlation propounded in the
literature between remedial preferences and class background does
not hold in Atlanta, one of the three cities that has been invoked as a
prime example of the phenomenon of middle-class support for, and
black working-class resistance to, Brown.230 By undermining the accu-
racy of Bell's thesis as applied to Atlanta, this narrative calls into ques-
tion its overall legitimacy.
That said, the Atlanta narrative does not suggest an overly broad
conclusion about African American communities' perspectives on
school desegregation. To the contrary, an overarching theme in this
Article is that it is arrogant and dangerous to make sweeping conclu-
sions about African American dispositions toward Brown. Such broad
conclusions only serve to reinscribe and reinforce racialist and racist
assumptions about African American behavior and attitudes. Reduc-
tionist stereotypes of the type advanced in the legal literature are an
inappropriate foundation for a putatively progressive theory of equal-
ity in education and public interest lawyering. Even if well-
intentioned, constitutional analyses that are predicated on such un-
complicated correlations between status and remedial preferences are
228 See, e.g., Drew S. Days 111, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, in
REDEFINING EQUALIYY, supra note 225, at 139, 150 ("Concerns about the burdens
blacks have had to carry in the desegregation process, the degree to which integration
requires assimilation and rejection of black values and institutions, and the ... prob-
lems presented for.., black school systems in education extremis are causing growing
numbers of blacks to rethink Brown's integrative ideal.").
For studies showing African American preference for integrated schools, see
AMY STUART WELLS & ROBERT L. CRAIN, STEPPING OVER THE COLOR LINE: AFRICAN-
AMERICAN STUDENTS IN WHITE SUBURBAN SCHOOLS 180-218 (1997).
230 See Bell, supra note 1, at 482-87 (addressing school desegregation issues in Bos-
ton, Detroit, and Atlanta).
2003] 1969
1970 UNIVERSI7"Y OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 151:1913
acts of intellectual and political hegemony, the upshot of which may
be to undermine clients' remedial aspirations in the name of advanc-
ing them.
Rather than suggesting that African American communities held a
uniform and easily discernable point of view on Brown, this narrative
demonstrates that African Americans held many points of view about
the proper approach to achieving educational equality over time.
This Article has shown that these perspectives were related to indi-
viduals' experiences and identities as members of a racialized group
and as persons of higher or lower socioeconomic status-but not in-
exorably so. A range of factors-including interpersonal relationships
and impersonal forces-superimposed themselves on the variables of
race and class, making individuals' social outlooks highly contingent
at any particular point in time. Historical analysis of the proper sort,
then, is not "usable" in legal debates in the manner that some legal
scholars would prefer.
B. Of the Contingency of Sociolegal Change: Local People's
Impact on the "Hollow Hope"
My finding that a vocal segment of Atlanta's working class and
poor supported Brown's remedial vision during the 1970s over the op-
position of a group of elite decision makers holds significant implica-
tions for the ongoing debate about the proper nature of remedies to
address educational inequality. These working-class clients embraced
Brown's original conception of equality, but they did not draw a hard
and fast distinction between Brown as a doctrinal rule mandating ra-
cial balance (or dignitary equality and cosmetic change) and Brown as
a legal mechanism for addressing concerns about in-school quality (or
substantive educational opportunity). Hence, my analysis suggests
that those who embrace formalistic conceptions of legal remedies in
educational discrimination cases do a disservice to client-
communities. These clients demand creative approaches to their
problems that do not begin or end with neat legalisms. Hence, over-
weening concern with conceptual schemes imposed by a particular
mode of constitutional interpretation or argumentation is antithetical
231 See Martin Flaherty, History "Lite" and Modern Ametican Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 523, 529 (1995) ("[A]ny theory opting for reductive simplicity, espe-
cially for the sake of either democratic process or individual liberty, is likely to forfeit
its claim to historical credibility, at least to the extent it purports to rest on the nation's
nascent constitutional experience.").
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to effective public interest lawyering. This lesson was lost on LDF law-
yers who championed the desegregation of Atlanta's schools during
the crucial post-Swann stage.
My analysis further suggests a tension between the Supreme
Court's desire in Swann to mandate compliance with Brown and its
demand in the same case that school systems root out the vestiges of
de jure segregation sixteen years after the remedial decree in Brown
originally was entered, a period during which white resistance was
consistent.2 32 To state the point more bluntly, given the Court's foot
dragging, the Atlanta litigation's end in such spectacular defeat for
LDF is less a wonder than the fact that there were not many more At-
lanta-like debacles post-Swann. By the early 1970s, American society
had been revolutionized by the changes in social and political rela-
tions produced by Brown, even if, and in some cases precisely because,
school districts had not widely complied with the letter of the law es-
tablished in the case itself.
To recap just a few of the explosive changes related to Brown or
white resistance to it, the Voting Rights Act of 1965233 had been passed
and African Americans had been elected mayor in a handful of cities,
Cleveland, Newark, and Atlanta included.234 Lyndon Johnson's Great
Society programs had enlarged the welfare state and thereby raised
the public's consciousness of poverty, creating an expectation among
poor people that they were entitled both to subsistence and to influ-
23 5ence political decision making. And a radicalized student move-
ment and the Black Power movement had emerged, both emphasiz-
ing the abject conditions of blacks living in poverty and questioning
the legitimacy of legal and political systems that did not address their
fates 236
232 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) ("The
objective... remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed
segregation.").
Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971
(2000)). Of course, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), was important as well.
234 See MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1990, at 77, 92-113 (2d ed. 1991) (describ-
ing African Americans' struggle for political equality in the 1960s).
235 SeeWILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY: AMERICA SINCE WORLD WAR
II 233-46 (1986) (addressing the accomplishments and failures ofJohnson's Great So-
ciety programs).
See MARABLE, supra note 234, at 93-99 (addressing the rise of "Black Power" be-
tween 1965 and 1970, the "dominant ideological concept" amongst black youths, and
20031 1971
1972 UN!IVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 151:1913
These circumstances, among others, set the stage for the internec-
ine battles waged in Atlanta during the early 1970s, making Swann
more of a lightning rod than the watershed constitutional event that
the Court and many commentators have supposed . After the pas-
sage of so much time and the occurrence of so many significant
changes in sociopolitical life, it was only logical that African Ameri-
cans, in Atlanta and elsewhere, had developed differing opinions con-
cerning the meaning of and the proper way to implement Brown.
In fact, this development-public discussion of divergent views by
and among African Americans-was indicative of progress. After all, the
civil rights movement liberated blacks from the constraints imposed
by Jim Crow, not the least of which were stereotypes that forced a race-
based sociopolitical cohesion born of disenfranchisement and disem-
powerment. Such cohesion was improbable after the chains of dejure
segregation no longer bound African Americans together and dis-
crimination began to affect different segments of African Americans
in distinct ways.
By highlighting the vagaries of black social life post-Swann, the At-
lanta narrative makes clear the interrelationship between legal change
and social dynamics in African American communities. Typically, le-
gal scholars have elided this interconnectivity in deference to legal-
ized ways of viewing the world, epistemologies that make the perspec-
tives and actions of legal actors paramount in analysis. This worldview
wrongly discounts the agency of people affected by legal rules and
misapprehends the ability of local, minority client-communities to in-
fluence and even undermine the implementation of antidiscrimina-
2,18tion norms.
the black working- and middle-class promotion of "the inclusion of all men in a com-
mon moral and political struggle").
237 See DOUGLAS, supra note 48, at 212 ("The Supreme Court's Swann decision had
an immediate impact across the South. [An] overwhelming majority of... judges or-
dered the elimination of all majority-black schools ...."); GREENBERG, supra note 49,
at 389 ("We filed Swann motions in all our pending cases and, for the first time, thor-
oughgoing desegregation became widespread."); THOMAS W. HANCHETr, SORTING
OUT THE NEW SOUTHI Crl1 : RACE, CLASS, AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN CHARLOTTE,
1875-1975, at 12, 251-53 (1998) (describing the Supreme Court's decision in Swann as
a "landmark precedent for schools nationwide" because it "both summed up the re-
sults of decades of govermnent-promoted segregation and also signaled the questions
that were beginning to arise ... concerning the desirability of a sorted-out city").
Douglas, the historian of Swann and Charlotte, undoubtedly is correct that the case was
successful in producing school desegregation in Charlotte, although my work shows
that it clearly was not successful in Atlanta.
238 By contrast, for examples of some of the most well-received recent historical
works that have demonstrated the impact of lay citizens on developments in constitu-
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This lesson, lost on LDF, was understood well by the ACLU lawyer
who followed the lead of local activists in filing the second Atlanta
school desegregation case. Ultimately, the activists and their ACLU
lawyer did not achieve their legal goals. This fact only reinforces the
point made here, however, that law and social dynamics affect one
another in complex ways. Hence, the ability to anticipate and re-
spond to sociopolitical contingencies is a critically important factor
affecting the success of social reform campaigns through law. Indeed,
this skill is just as important as the ability to define the goals of social
reform litigation and to develop strategies for reaching these goals,
which logically are necessary skills for the "social engineer.
' '
211
By recognizing the possibilities created when the local people af-
fected by landmark legal victories exercise social agency, this narrative
is saved from its most pessimistic reading. I do not mean simply to af-
firm that any belief in courts' ability to bring about significant social
change is no more than a "hollow hope. 2 40 The proper question is
not whether courts alone can produce significant social change, '2 4 ' but
rather, how lawyers and advocates can create the sociopolitical condi-
tions that give rise to social movements whose momentum the Su-
preme Court cannot stop when movement lawyers bring test cases be-
fore it. This Article has shed light on this inquiry by demonstrating
that lawyers' disengagement from the client-community, especially
one torn by internal tensions, will only exacerbate, rather than ame-
tional law post-Brown, see FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 27; CHARLES M. PAYNE, I'VE GOT
THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING TRADITION AND THE MississiPPi FREEDOM
STRUGGLE 392 (1995).
239 See GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 84-85, 133, 216-17 (1983) ("A social engineer was a
highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive lawyer who understood the Constitution ... and
knew how to explore its uses in the solving of 'problems of... local communities' and
in 'bettering conditions of the underprivileged citizens."' (second omission in origi-
nal) (quoting Charles Houston)).
24 See ROSENBERG, supra note 19, at 338 (arguing that "U.S. courts can almost never
be effective producers of significant social reform").
241 Rosenberg admitted the futility of the "Dynamic Court" view in his study by
suggesting an alternative "Constrained Court" view that admitted of the possibility that
courts might contribute to social change under certain political, social, and economic
circumstances. See id. at 5-6 (comparing and contrasting the "Constrained Court" and
"Dynamic Court" views). In other words, ultimately he understood that the appropri-
ate inquiry is not whether courts can produce significant social change, but under what
conditions. The latter formulation is fit for the historian, and it is this more nuanced
question that this Article addresses.
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liorate, the status-quo-preserving tendencies of law, undermining the
142possibility that courts will further efforts to achieve social change.
C. The Challenge ofDifference amid Sameness
Still, it is true that while other constitutional scholars and histori-
ans who have written about Brown v. Board of Education have tended to
focus on the case as an example of law's positive impact on social life,
this analysis has demonstrated the inadequacy of some of the concepts
used to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, law's limitations
have been described in terms of legal norms that enforce false notions
of community. The Atlanta narrative is a cautionary tale regarding
the substantive limits of the constitutional norms that judges and ad-
vocates rely on to resolve equal protection claims.
The stunningly unsatisfactory end to the Atlanta school desegre-
gation campaigns suggests that the "sameness" concept relied on to
settle disputes in equal protection jurisprudence-the convention that
"likes" should be treated "alike" or that individuals classified as be-
longing to a common racial group have no differences salient to law-
can lead to faulty outcomes in the most difficult cases. It can frustrate
the just resolution of race discrimination class actions when significant
disagreement exists within a group whose constitutionally "suspect"
status is based on racial identity. In Atlanta, not only the courts but also
plaintiffs' own counsel largely ignored the intraracial conflict that devel-
oped in the case after Swann. The result of the legal actors' attitudes
was to deny members of the class who objected to the Calhoun settle-
ment any meaningful opportunity to have their concerns addressed.
By disagreeing with other African Americans, the objectors upset the
convention requiring minority groups to act as if all group members
embrace a monolithic point of view. This interpretative norm-which
is a constituent element of constitutional law-devalues, even pun-
ishes, expressions of dissent.
Of course, legal fictions are necessary; it is unreasonable to expect
law to capture humankind's true complexity or to respond to the
whims of every individual plaintiff. Thus, my quarrel is not with the
sameness norm per se, but with legal actors' failure to appreciate that
sameness is, after all, a socially constructed norm. It is a fine tool for
242 For discussions of law's status-quo-preserving character, see GIRARDEAU A.
SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 3 (1993): Reva Siegel, 1'Vty Equal Protection No Longer Protects:
The Evolving Fornts of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997).
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understanding the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, but
only where real intraracial differences, most particularly factors rele-
vant to fashioning remedies, do not exist. Where, as in the Atlanta
cases, intraracial differences are apparent, they must be confronted
and addressed by plaintiffs' counsel and the courts.
The social and historical reality of difference amid sameness un-
covered in this historical account both calls public interest lawyers to
arms and stands to correct the notion within some scholarly circles
that difference among individuals that experience group-based harm
is of necessity a liability to efforts to achieve change through law. 43
Admittedly, difference among "likes" makes for complexity because of
the simplistic equation of status with rights in equal protection juris-
prudence. If that complexity ultimately yields a remedial outcome
more satisfactory to client-communities, however, then grappling with
difference is, in the final analysis, a social good.
CONCLUSION
This Article has asserted the relevance of intraracial class dynam-
ics as a factor constraining civil rights lawyers' efforts to implement
the landmark social norm decreed in Brown v. Board of Education-the
paradigmatic social reform class action. While this Article has en-
deavored to reintroduce class as an analytical factor in the legal litera-
ture that considers Brown, in particular, and social reform litigation,
generally, I do not mean to replace one narrow mode of thinking
(about race) with another (about class). Nor does the Atlanta story
lend itself to such a distortion of my claim regarding the relevance of
class. The effort here is an attempt to understand the interplay of
class and race, and not to assert the analytical prominence of one
variable over the other.
The overall lesson that the Atlanta narrative teaches is much
broader than such a hierarchy of oppressions suggests. This story
243 See PATRIcIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LA1ATERS AND COURTS IN
THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 12-13 (2000) (characterizing the
sameness argument for gay rights as easier to articulate politically, morally, and legally
than the difference argument); see also Christine H. Rossell, The Convergence of Black and
White Attitudes on School Desegregation Issues, in REDEFINING EQUALITY, supfra note 225, at
120, 120-23 (utilizing data to show that, like many whites, many blacks do not view
mandatory reassignment and busing as being in their sell-interest and that this conver-
gence of opinion makes the "public policy arena enormously complex," even while ar-
guing that only the outnumbered "civil fights establishment" favors mandatory reas-
signment).
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demonstrates that class is but one of many factors that may influence
plaintiffs' perceptions of the propriety of remedies for unequal educa-
tion or for any of the other discriminations that groups may experi-
ence based on status. Hence, the goal for lawyers who represent
groups that experience status-based infractions of their rights should
be to bring as many of these influences as possible to bear on the task
of fashioning remedies without destroying the solidarity among group
members derived from a status-based harm. In other words, rather
than assuming that the class-action approach to social change requires
plaintiff uniformity around a particular goal or strategy, public inter-
est lawyers should focus on ways in which the law can accommodate
the multidimensionality of plaintiffs brought together as a class due to
the continuing reality of status-based discrimination. In this way, law
can expand to accommodate the real experiences of litigants rather
than confine them to legal categories, such as the "suspect class" fic-
tion, that are predicated on an imagined and rigidly categorized hu-
man condition.
